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thoughts on US welfare programs.  Social Safety Net Primer Series 
The World Bank Social Safety Nets Primer is intended to provide a practical resource for those 
engaged in the design and implementation of safety net programs around the world. Readers will find 
information on good practices for a variety of types of interventions, country contexts, themes and target 
groups, as well as current thinking of specialists and practitioners on the role of social safety nets in the 
broader development agenda. Primer papers are designed to reflect a high standard of quality as well as a 
degree of consensus among the World Bank safety nets team and general practitioners on good practice 
and policy. Primer topics are initially reviewed by a steering committee composed of both World Bank 
and outside specialists, and draft papers are subject to peer review for quality control. Yet the format of 
the series is flexible enough to reflect important developments in the field in a timely fashion.  
The primer series contributes to the teaching materials covered in the annual Social Safety Nets 
course offered in Washington, DC as well as various other Bank-sponsored courses. The Social Safety 
Nets Primer and the annual course are jointly supported by the Social Protection unit of the Human 
Development Network and by the World Bank Institute. The World Bank Institute also offers customized 
regional courses through Distance Learning on a regular basis. 
For more information on the primer paper series and papers on other safety nets topics, please 
contact the Social Protection Advisory Service; telephone (202) 458-5267; fax (202) 614-0471; email: 
socialprotection@worldbank.org. Copies of related safety nets papers, including the Social Safety Nets 
Primer series, are available in electronic form at www.worldbank.org/safetynets. The website also 
contains translated versions of the papers as they become available. An ambitious translation plan is 
underway (especially for Spanish and French, some in Russian). For more information about WBI 
courses on social safety nets, please visit the website www.worldbank.org/wbi/socialsafetynets.  
Papers in the Safety Nets Primer as of June 2005 
Theme Author 
Program Interventions 
Cash Transfers  Tabor, Steve 
Cash Transfers Benefits  Lafaurie and Valasquez 
Community-based Health Insurance  Tabor, Steve 
Conditional Cash Transfers  Rawlings, Laura 
Fee Waivers in Health   Bitran and Giedion 
Fee Waivers in Housing   Katsura and Romanik 
Food Related Programs  Rogers and Coates 
Micro Credit and Informal Insurance  Sharma and Morduch 
Mitigating Social Risks  Tesliuc, Emil 
Price and Tax Subsidies  Alderman, Harold 
Public Works  Subbarao, Kalanidhi 
Cross-cutting Issues 
Evaluation Blomquist,  John 
Gender  Ezemenari, Chaudhury and Owens 
Institutions  de Neubourg, Chris 
Political Economy Aspects of Targeting  Pritchett, Lant 
Public Attitudes and Political Economy  Graham, Carol 
Safety Nets for Poverty Reduction  Ravillion, Martin 
Targeting  Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott 
Targeting: Lessons from LAC – Overview  Lindert et all 
Targeting in Brazil  Lindert and Brière 
Targeting in Chile (Spanish)  Larrañga, Osvaldo 
Targeting in Colombia   Castañeda, Tarsicio 
Targeting in Costa Rica (Spanish)  Viguez, Roxana 
Targeting in Mexico (Spanish)  Orozco and Hubert 
Testing Vietnam’s Public Safety Nets  van de Walle, Dominique 
Country Setting/Target Group 
Poverty and Aging in Africa  Subbarao, Schwartz and Kakwani 
Transition Economies  Fox, Louise 
Very Low Income Countries  Smith and Subbarao 
Special Vulnerable Group 
Disability Mitra,  Sophie Preface 
 
This case study is part of six Country Case Study Reports that were commissioned in 2003 by the 
World Bank specifically for the purposes of a summary report on the design and implementation 
of household targeting systems in the following countries: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Brazil and the United States. Research findings and earlier drafts of the report were presented at 
numerous workshops and seminars (two in Brazil in November 2003; two at the World Bank in 
Washington in November 2003 and January 2005; and one at the Second International Workshop 
of Conditional Cash Transfers in Sao Paulo in April 2004).  The final version of the report as well 
as the other country case studies have been published as Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 
0526 to 0532 and can be found at www.worldbank.org/safetynets.  
Abstract 
 
While targeting can effectively channel resources to the poor, implementation details matter tremendously to 
distributive outcomes.  Several key factors affect performance, including: data collection processes; 
information management; household assessment mechanisms; institutional arrangements; and monitoring 
and oversight mechanisms.  This report conducts an in-depth assessment of key design and implementation 
factors and their potential impact on outcomes for the household targeting system used in the United States to 
target social programs to the poor and vulnerable.  Table of Contents 
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OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this study are to conduct an overview of means-tested welfare systems in the US so as to 
draw on lessons-learned for middle-income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) who may 
be reforming or designing such systems themselves.  The review is part of a six-country study of the 
implementation of means-tested safety net systems (the other countries being Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Costa Rica).  LAC policy makers and systems designers can benefit not only from the 
experiences in other countries so as to build on the positive experiences and avoid the negative ones made by 
other countries, including the US.   
 
Most middle-income LAC countries use proxy variables (instead of income) for eligibility purposes.  Some 
are considering shifting to income-based eligibility, while others are already using unverified incomes as the 
basis for beneficiary selection.   
 
The systems in the US are of interest because they rely in means-testing eligibility criteria based on incomes 
and assets as well as rigorous verification systems to improve target accuracy.  These systems have indeed 
resulted in very well targeted programs in the US, with extremely low leakage rates to the non-poor.   
However, participation rates among potentially eligible families have also fallen (errors of exclusion), 
suggesting that complex procedures across numerous programs, work requirements and other program design 
features may be discouraging potential applicants. Outreach efforts and changes in performance-based 
management to focus on both target accuracy and poverty reduction could help improve participation rates.  
The US case is also interesting because it shows just how complex it can be to try to integrate a fragmented 
safety net (with over 80 federal programs) at the local level.  LAC countries likewise tend to face a 
proliferation of social assistance programs.  The US experience suggests that – if political conditions permit -
- other countries should consider avoiding such a situation and aim to better integrate or coordinate programs 
at their origins (federal level).    
 
The review begins with an overview of the social safety net in the United States, as well as recent reforms, 
which is important for understanding the complex maze of means-tested systems in the US.  It then turns to a 
review of eligibility criteria and applications processes for the main programs.  The issues of verifying 
eligibility and reducing errors in eligibility and fraud – which receive extensive attention in the US – are then 
reviewed.  The study then reviews crucial role of automated information systems in supporting the 
implementation of means-tested programs in the US.  Finally, the study reviews available evidence on 
targeting accuracy as an outcome of these processes.  
 
POVERTY AND POLICY CONTEXT 
Poverty Context 
Poverty in the United States averaged about 13.7% of the population during the decade of the 1990s.   
Poverty rates fell dramatically at the end of the 1990s, reaching a historical low of 11.3% in 2000.
1  With the 
recent recession and rising unemployment, however, poverty rates have inched up in recent years (to 11.7% 
in 2001 with even higher predicted rates for 2002).
2  Poverty rates are historically highest in the South and 
lowest in the Midwest.  They are also far higher among children, with about 18.2% of all American children 
living in poverty in 2001 (up from 17.8% in 2000).  Poverty is also higher among the black (22.6%), 
indigenous (22.5%) and Hispanic (21.5%) populations, as compared with the white population (9.7%).   6
Overview of the Social Safety Net in the United States 
Over 80 means-tested federal programs provide assistance – in cash and in kind – to low-income individuals 
and households in the United States (Table 1).  Such programs constitute the “social safety net” or public 
welfare system.   They cost an estimated US$437 billion in FY2000, representing 4.4% of GDP.
3  About 
70% was financed with federal funds, with the remainder coming from state and local coffers.  Total safety 
net spending in FY2000 set a new record high, up 7% from the previous peak in FY1999.    
 
Over half of all welfare spending goes to medical-related assistance, with another fifth going to cash-based 
transfers (Table 1).  Food- and housing-based  in-kind transfer programs each account for about 8% of 
spending on the safety net.   
 
Table 1 – Total Spending on Federal Means-Tested Social Assistance by Type of Program, 2000 
  Number of Programs  Federal, $bn  State-Local, $bn  Total, $bn  % of Total 
Medical Care  9  131.5  94.4  225.9  52% 
Cash Transfers  11  72.5  19.2  91.7  21% 
Food-Based Transfers  11  32.2  2.2  34.3  8% 
Housing Assistance  16  29.3  5.6  34.9  8% 
Education Aid  14  19.0  1.3  20.4  5% 
Services 9  14.2  6.5  20.7  5% 
Jobs/training 12  6.2  1.1  7.4  2% 
Energy Aid  2  1.6  0.1  1.7  0% 
Total 84  306.5  130.5  437.0  100% 
Burke, Vee (November 2001).  “Cash and Noncash Benefits for Persons with Limited Income: Eligibility Rules, Recipient and Expenditure Data, 
FY1998-2000.  Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress. 
 
Social Safety Net or Patchwork Quilt?
4 
The US system of social assistance for low-income families falls short of a tightly-woven safety net.
5  
Numerous federal departments and agencies, state and local offices, community-based organizations, and 
other entities are responsible for administering these programs.
6  Authorized by different congressional 
committees at different points in time (many spanning back to the 1930s), these programs were created to 
meet the specific needs of different poor and vulnerable groups.  Some programs (such as Medicaid, 
discussed below), constitute entitlements that guarantee benefits to all eligible applicants, while others (such 
as child care and housing) operate with discretionary funds that are sufficient to cover only a fraction of 
qualifying applicants.  Different sets of rules and regulations govern benefit eligibility across the 80-some 
programs that serve low-income individuals and families.  When viewed as a whole, the proliferation of 
programs has given rise to longstanding concerns that the nation’s “safety net” is more of a “patchwork 
quilt”
7 that is fragmented, difficult and costly to administer and too complex for the poor to navigate.   
Indeed, the fragmentation of the safety net contributes to inefficiencies, such as duplication of administrative 
activities and undue burden on the clients.   
 
Local Attempts to Better Integrate the Safety Net 
While politics and bureaucracy have so far prevented integration of the safety net at the federal level, many 
efforts have been made to try to simplify and better coordinate programs at the state- and local-levels.  These 
include: (a) developing joint application processes for many welfare programs; (b) taking advantage of recent 
reforms to better realign financial eligibility rules across programs; and (c) using computer information 
systems as a tool to streamline eligibility determination.
8  Attempts have also been made to better integrate 
social assistance programs with social services and workforce development services (including through the 
use of joint “one-stop shops”).  Many of these issues are discussed in more detail below.   
   7
Recent Reforms: Shifting from Income Maintenance to Self-Sufficiency for Beneficiaries 
Social assistance in the US has also undergone a significant policy shift, culminating in the major welfare 
reforms passed by Congress in 1996 (the “PRWORA Reforms” or Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act).   Prior to these reforms, the social assistance system adopted a more 
“passive” welfare policy, whereby “need is a circumstance that aid in and of itself alleviates” (poverty 
alleviation and income maintenance).
9  Passive assistance programs emphasize income maintenance and 
support, and the key design concerns involve eligibility (targeting) and benefit calculations.   
 
In contrast, the reforms made a dramatic philosophical shift, adopting an “active stance” towards welfare in 
which “need is treated as a situation that aid alters” (poverty reduction and self-sufficiency).  Active 
programs serve not only to catch people when they fall (safety net), but also to help them pull out of poverty 
(springboard).
10  Active welfare programs emphasize helping clients achieve self-sufficiency, and key design 
concerns involve (a)  behavioral change, usually through conditions requiring work and human capital 
investments on behalf of beneficiaries; and (b) active case management, linking clients to complementary 
support services (such as child care, transport subsidies, employment assistance, etc.) and tracking their 
progress towards mutually-agreed goals.   
 
Overview of the Main Welfare Programs 
The “traditional welfare package” consists of cash assistance (now through the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families Program, TANF), food stamps, and assistance with health care costs (under the Medicaid 
program).  Basic program data for these programs are included in Table 2.  Of these, the way in which cash 
assistance is implemented has undergone the most significant change in the post-reform era. 
 
Cash Assistance – With a Twist.  Historically, cash assistance was provided under the program known as 
“Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).”  This program adopted the “passive” welfare policy 
approach, with the main focus being the provision of income support.  Over time, critiques mounted that this 
entitlement program created multiple generations of welfare dependence, trapped families in poverty, and 
encouraged births outside of marriage.  To overcome some of these problems, states were granted legal 
“waivers” exempting them from certain AFDC requirements and allowing them to experiment with 
alternative approaches to welfare.  Building on these innovative experiments, the 1996 reforms eliminated 
the AFDC program, replacing it with TANF.  TANF continues to provide cash transfers to low-income 
families, but its emphasis is largely on helping these families achieve economic independence.  Three key 
features help promote self-sufficiency through an “active” welfare policy: (a) work requirements (Table 3); 
(b) lifetime welfare time limits (Table 3); and (c) support for, and links to, other key complementary social 
and work services, such as child care, transport subsidies, and employment services.  Many states also 
impose additional conditionalities geared towards behavioral change and long-run investments in human 
capital, such as requirements involving school attendance or achievement, immunizations and health 
screening (Table 3).   
 
TANF is funded through a block grant to states (which was set at the amount spent on AFDC in the mid-
1990s; coincidentally, these years recorded the highest levels of spending in history).  States are required to 
spend a certain minimum of their own money on the program, which is based on a certain percentage
11 of 
non-federal spending on AFDC in 1994 (known as the “maintenance of effort” requirement).  Total spending 
(federal and state) on TANF amounted to US$24 billion in FY2000, or about 5.5% of total safety net 
spending.  Of this, less than half funded direct cash transfers, with the remainder funding child care 
subsidies, work activities, other work supports, and administrative costs (Table 2).   
 
TANF covers over five million recipients (5.9 million in 2000 and 5.4 million in 2001), which is down from 
12.6 million at the advent of reforms in 1996.  Many cite this dramatic decrease as a signal of success of the 
program, attributing it to increased self-sufficiency of the low-income population.  Others link it to the strong   8
economy in the 1990s, though the recent recession would not explain the continued downward trend in recent 
years.  Recent studies have concluded that the reduction in the caseload is primarily the result of 
implementation of welfare reforms.
12  Whether this is to be interpreted as a success depends in part on the 
political leanings of the analyst.  Regardless of political affiliation, however, studies have shown that some of 
the decline occurred because a smaller percentage of eligible families now participate in the program.
13  
Some likely factors contributing to self-selection out of the program include: the heavy work requirements 
imposed on beneficiaries (some even required before eligibility is determined, as discussed below), the maze 
of different rules governing eligibility, and tighter restrictions on immigrant eligibility.   
 
In addition, an important feature of TANF is the use of welfare diversion policies, which could also explain 
part of the decline in TANF participation. Diversion strategies seek to meet the needs of potential welfare 
recipients in ways other than through monthly cash assistance, such as by having them engage in immediate 
job search to obtain employment quickly, providing one-time cash payments (welfare avoidance grants), or 
providing support services such as child care and medical assistance.
14  As of 1999, 22 states had introduced 
formal diversion payments.  Families applying for a diversion payment must still meet TANF eligibility 
criteria (discussed below), and are usually ineligible for regular TANF cash transfers for a certain period of 
time after receiving the “welfare avoidance grant.”
15 
 
Reflecting the shift in emphasis, key performance indicators for the TANF include: (a) work participation 
rates (Table 3); (b) other employment-related indicators (% of adult TANF recipients who become newly 




Food Stamps – More Traditional Support.   Dating back to the 1930s and reinstated as a permanent 
program in the 1960s, the food stamps program is an enduring cornerstone of traditional US welfare policy.  
The program aims to “serve as the first line of defense against hunger” by enabling low income families to 
buy food with coupons and electronic benefit transfer cards.  These “near-cash” income supports cost the 
government about US$20 billion in 2000, or just under 5% of total safety net spending.  The benefits of the 
program are completely funded by the federal government, which also funds 50% of the program’s 
administrative costs (with state-local governments funding the rest).  
 
While the thrust of the 1996 welfare reforms focused on cash transfers, food stamps were not immune to 
these reforms.  Rather, they were affected directly through provisions to (a)  introduce limited work 
requirements, (b)  impose time limits on unemployed able-bodied adults without dependents; and (c) 
disqualify most permanent resident aliens.  In addition, TANF reforms affected food stamps, as many 
potentially eligible beneficiaries apply jointly for these benefits and hence shied away from food stamps as 
well as TANF (due to various requirements and the complexity of different eligibility rules governing the 
different programs, as discussed further below).  This can help explain the dramatic drop in beneficiaries 
from 28 million persons in 1994 (the program’s peak) to some 18 million in FY2000, as well as the fall in the 
participation rate of potentially eligible individuals.  These issues are discussed in more detail below.   
 
Despite these reforms, food stamps essentially remain a “passive” income-maintenance program.  As such 
the focus of their design, monitoring and evaluation is on eligibility (target accuracy).  Indeed, one of the 
main program indicators that is monitored is the “error rate,” which represents the share of benefits that are 
miscalculated– either paying too much or too little to applicants and beneficiaries due to mis-targeting.  
Significant efforts are made to monitor these error rates (“quality control,” as discussed in more detail 
below), and states pay significant penalties (“sanctions”) if their error rates exceed the national average.  
Other key performance indicators include the participation of eligible households, characteristics of 
beneficiary households, appropriate use of food stamps (spending on food), and fraud.   
 
Medicaid – the Largest Social Assistance Program.  Medicaid was launched in 1965 as a jointly-funded 
cooperative venture between the Federal and State governments to assist States in the provision of adequate   9
medical care to needy persons.  It is the largest program in the safety net portfolio, accounting for almost half 
of total social assistance spending in FY2000.  It is also the largest program providing medical and health-
related services to the poor and specific categories of groups (Table 5).  State Medicaid programs must 
provide certain federally-mandated benefits, such as physician services, inpatient and outpatient hospital 
services, laboratory and x-ray services.  In addition, states may offer optional services, such as dental, 
physical therapy, prescription drugs, and case management services.  Medicaid also provides assistance to 
hospitals for the cost of uncompensated care.
17   
 
Other Programs – Piecing together the Patchwork Quilt.  While the traditional welfare package (TANF, 
food stamps, and Medicaid) accounts for close to 60% of total social assistance spending, another 81 
programs piece together to form the safety net.  Table 2 summarizes the main features and program data for 
eight other major programs (in addition to TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid), which account for 22% of 
total safety net spending in the US.  These include other cash programs (EITC and SSI), food-based 
programs (school lunches, WIC), the state children’s health insurance program, and various housing and 
energy support programs to low-income households, all run by different agencies.   
   10
Table 2 – Main Means-Tested Welfare Programs in the U.S.: Description, Funding, Spending, Beneficiaries 
Program  Description / Type of 
Benefits 
Funding Source   Federal 
Agency 
Total Spending 
(FY 2000, US$ bn) 
Administrative Costs 
(% of total) 
Average Benefits  
(per person/year) 
# of Recipients 




•  Cash transfers 
conditional on work 
requirements 
•  Also funds child care 
subsidies and other 
work support services 
•  Federal block 
grant to states 
•  States also 
provide 
funding 
HHS  $24 bn, of which: 
•  48% on cash transfers 
($11.5 bn) 
•  13% on child care 
•  10% on work 
activities 
•  19% on other work 
support programs 
•  10% on admin costs 
10% ($2.4 bn, 2000), 
of which: $321 on 
information systems, 
$2.1 on admin. costs 
 
(This is well below 
the federal limit of 
15%) 
$1935 for cash 
benefits 
(about 41% of 
FPL in 2000)* 
 





Food Stamps  •  Near cash assistance in 
form of food coupons 
or electronic benefit 
transfer cards that can 
be used in authorized 
retail stores to 
purchase food 
•  Federal 
government 
funds 100% of 
benefits, 50% 
of admin. costs 
USDA  $20.3 bn (2000) 
 
Of which: 
•  $18 bn paid out in 
benefits (food 
stamps) 
11% (2002)  $876 
(about 19% of 
FPL in 2000)* 
18.2 million 
Medicaid  •  Medical- and health-
related services 
•  Joint federal-
state 
HHS  •  $207.2 billion  2.1% (1998)  $4827 
(about 102% of 






•  Health insurance for 
uninsured children 
from low-income 
working families with 
incomes too high to 
qualify for medicaid 
•  Jointly federal-
state 
HHS  •  $2.5 billion   n.a. $750 
(about 16% of 
FPL in 2000)* 
3.3 million 
EITC (Earned 
Income Tax Credit) 
•  A “refundable” tax 
credit for working low 
income families 
•  100% federally 
funded 
IRS  •  25.8  n.a. $466 
(about 10% of 




•  Provide minimum 
income floor for low-
income persons who 
are aged 65+, blind or 
disabled 




SSA  •  35.1  7.0% (1998)  $4933 
(about 105% of 
FPL in 2000)* 
6.6 million 
Continued Next Page   11
Table 2 – Main Means-Tested Welfare Programs in the U.S.: Description, Funding, Spending, Beneficiaries -- Continued 
Program  Description / Type of 
Benefits 
Funding Source   Federal 
Agency 
Total Spending 
(FY 2000, US$ bn) 
Administrative Costs 
(% of total) 
Average Benefits  
(per person/year) 
# of Recipients 
(FY 2000, mn) 
School Lunch  •  Free and reduced 
prices lunches for 
school children 
•  Federal subsidy  USDA  •  5.6 (federal only)  7.8% (1998)  $335 





for Women and 
Infant Children) 
•  Food commodity 
rations, nutrition 
services 
•  All federal  USDA  •  3.9  9.0% (1998)  $498 
(about 11% of 
FPL in 2000)* 
3.9 million 
Low Income 
Housing (Section 8) 
•  Rent subsidies and 
vouchers 
•  All federal  HUD  •  16.0  5.2% (1998)  $4738 per HH 
(about 33% of 
FPL in 2000)* 
 
16.0 million 
Low rent public 
housing 
•  Public housing  •  All federal  HUD  •  6.5  22.3% (1998)  $4002 per HH 
(about 28% of 






•  Transfers for energy 
exp.   
•  100% federal, 
block grants 
HHS  •  1.5  9.1% (1998)  $331 per HH 
(about 2% of FPL 
in 2000)* 
1.5 million 
Compiled by the author.  Spending, beneficiary information from:  
•  Burke, Vee (November 2001).  “Cash and Noncash Benefits for Persons with Limited Income: Eligibility Rules, Recipient and Expenditure Data, FY1998-2000.  Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) Report for Congress. 
•  Information on TANF from Office of Family Assistance (April 2002). Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Fourth Annual Report to Congress. 
•  Administrative cost data for food stamps from: USDA/FNS (July 2003).  “Characteristics of Food Stamp Households: Fiscal Year 2002, advance report). 
•  Administrative cost data for other programs from: General Accounting Office (November 2001): Means-Tested Programs: Determining Financial Eligibility is Cumbersome and Can Be 
Simplified.  GAO-02-58.   
•  *Average benefit levels (per recipient per year) calculated as (total program spending – administrative costs)/total recipients; TANF calculated as total spending on cash benefits/total 
recipients; and (total spending – administrative costs)/total recipients.   Benefits per household for housing/energy assistance.   %  federal poverty line (FPL) calculated as average benefit per 











Table 3 – Conditionalities and Requirements for TANF and Food Stamps Recipients 
Number of States with Requirements (1999)   
TANF Food  Stamps 
Time Limits  •  All (federal requirement): 5 year lifetime 
limit 
•  8 states have adopted even shorter 
lifetime limits 
•  16 states also impose other intermittent 
time limits (e.g., XX months followed by 
YY months of ineligibility) 
•  All (federal requirement): 
•  3 year limit (36) months for able-bodied 
adults between 18-50 without children if 
they do not work or participate in a 
workfare or employment training 
program other than job search 
Work Participation Requirements  All (federal requirement): 
•  40 hours for all non-exempt adults 
(regardless of number of parents, 2003 
reforms) 
•  Participation rates: 
o 50% all families, 90% for 2-parent 
families until 2002 
o 2003 reforms: increasing until 70% 
for all families in 2007 
•  All (federal requirement): 
•  Able-bodied adults between 16-60 must 
register for work, take part in an 
employment and training program, and 
accept or continue suitable employment 
for at least 20 hours per week 
School Conditionalities (minimum 
attendance or minimum grade-point 
average, otherwise sanctions apply) 
34 n.a. 
School Bonuses (financial incentives 




(otherwise sanctions apply) 
26 n.a. 
Health screening requirements 
(otherwise sanctions apply) 
6 n.a. 
Other Screening - Participation in 
Early and Periodic Screening, 
Diagnosis, and Treatment Program 
(EPSDT) 
2 n.a. 
Sources: Compiled by author with information from: Rowe, Gretchen (November 2000).  “Welfare Rules Databook: State TANF policies as of July 
1999.”  Urban Institute; and USDA/FNS and HHS/OFA websites. 
 
Institutional Roles by Level of Government 
Safety net programs in the US differ in the degree of devolution and decentralization.  Although the main 
programs are still very separate at the federal level (e.g., with separate financing sources, legislative and 
executive oversight), their implementation has been significantly delegated to, and integrated at, the “retail 
levels.”  Implementation of most programs is highly decentralized, with state and local (county) governments 
responsible for most aspects of program execution.  However, each program differs in the degree to which 
federal guidelines govern implementation.  With food stamps, for example, local governments implement the 
program under strict uniform federal criteria governing eligibility and benefit calculations (Tables 4 and 5).  
In contrast, with the TANF program – which is financed through federal block grants in addition to state 
funding – the determination of most of these criteria has been devolved to the states (Tables 4 and 5).  
Federal requirements are few, focusing mainly on the work requirements and time limits imposed under the 
PRWORA reforms in 1996.  States even operate TANF under programs with their own names, such as 
“Wisconsin Works,” “Work First New Jersey,” or Maryland’s “Family Investment Administration / 
Temporary Cash Assistance (TCA)” program.   
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Table 4 – TANF and Food Stamps in the US: Key Roles and Features by Level of Government 
Role  TANF
18
  Food Stamps 
Federal Oversight  Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of Family Assistance; 
Legislative Committee: House Appropriations 
Department of Agriculture, Food and 
Nutrition Service 
Legislative Committee: Agriculture 
Definition of Eligibility Criteria  State determined. 
Main federal criteria: children, citizenship 
Federal.  
Screening and Determination of 
Eligibility 
Local: Usually using a unified applicant data collection system operated by the state.  
Information system is unified, but criteria are program-specific 
Time limits (exit criteria)  Federal maximum, states can implement 
lower maximums and some exemptions 
Federal time limits that limit benefits to 
working-age childless with a three 
month maximum in a three year period 
Management of beneficiary 
database and information systems 
State/local level (usually integrated for traditional welfare package) 
Determination of Benefit Levels   State-wide formula,
19 applied at local offices 
(not federal) 
Federal (complex formula) 
Financing Fixed  federal block grants to states 
(established at highest levels in history).  
States required to maintain at least 75% of 
pre-reform state spending levels in order to 
receive full block grant.  Federal reserve fund 
available to provide additional resources in 
event of sudden increase of needs. 
Federal entitlement: federal government 
will pay states 100% of transfer costs 
and 50% (matching) of administrative 
costs. 
Payment of transfers  Usually state (e.g., the state comptroller), 
some via electronic debit cards, some via 
check 
State issues electronic benefit card to 
beneficiaries 
Main Performance Monitoring 
Indicators (federal oversight) 
Federal indicators:  
Work participation rates, financial penalties 
imposed on states for non-performance 
Federal indicators: 
(a) Target accuracy based on “error 
rates” and “Quality Control.”  Financial 
penalties imposed on states whose error 
rates exceed the national average.   
(b) Use of food stamps (purchasing only 
eligible food items) 
Beneficiary interface (applications, 
interactions with system and with 
case workers) 
Local (county) welfare offices.  Increasingly, these activities are being “integrated” at the 
retail level (integrated application forms, screening and eligibility reviews, case worker 
services) to link beneficiaries with social assistance (TANF, food stamps, medicaid, 
other), social services (e.g., substance abuse, domestic violence, child support), and work 
services (job readiness, job search, etc.) 
Other  Federal government helps states share 
information and experiences via the welfare 




TARGETING MECHANISMS & ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA 
Means testing is the main mechanism used to target safety net programs to poor and low-income individuals 
in the United States.  Most programs adopt a rigorous form of means-testing, applying several “tests” for 
eligibility with intensive verification and cross-checking of all information provided (discussed below).   
Table 5 provides examples of criteria for the three traditional welfare programs. Eligibility criteria are 
extremely complex and vary significantly across all 84 programs in the U.S. safety net. Moreover, for some 
programs, states have the responsibility for establishing eligibility criteria.  As such, these differ by state (and 
sometimes by county).  Such is the case for the TANF program.  In contrast the food stamps program adopts 
uniform national eligibility criteria.  Depending on the program and state, eligibility tests can include: 
•  Asset tests: (a) comparing financial assets to some pre-determined threshold; and (b) vehicle asset 
tests (allowing up to a certain amount of the fair market value of vehicles possessed by applicants);  
•  Gross income tests: comparing gross earned and unearned income to some pre-determined 
threshold (taking into account household size);   14
•  Net income tests: calculating net income (gross income minus some set of standard deductions and 
exemptions) and comparing it to some pre-determined threshold (taking into account household 
size); and 
•  Benefit calculations: implicit means tests whereby benefits are calculated as the maximum benefit 
level minus the income (net or gross) of the household (taking into account household size).  
 
Criteria differ across programs and states not only in terms of the types of tests performed (as per above), but 
also in terms of the definitions of incomes used (earned vs. unearned, amounts of income deductions and 
disregards, etc.) and for the definition of the beneficiary unit (household, family, assistance unit, etc.), as 
illustrated in Table 5.   
 
In terms of overall income thresholds, 
on average, state criteria for the 
TANF program imply a slightly 
poorer target population than the 
uniform federal criteria for the food 
stamps program and the threshold for 
the Medicaid program (Table 5).  The 
average income threshold for TANF 
equals about 60% of the federal 
poverty line.  This compares with 
gross and net income thresholds for 
the food stamps program of 128% and 
99% of the federal program 
respectively, and a threshold of 133% 
of the federal poverty line for 
Medicaid.  Strict comparisons, 
however, are complicated by the fact 
that each program counts incomes 
differently.
21   
 
In addition to means-testing, to some extent, the TANF program has additional features that introduce self-
targeting mechanisms into its design.  These include the imposition of strict work requirements and time 
limits.  Such requirements could dissuade certain potentially eligible individuals from applying.  As 
discussed below, however, this self-selection could discourage applicants both (a) at the higher end of the 
low-income spectrum from applying (e.g., those who are already working and for whom the extra benefits 
from the program may not outweigh the extra costs of the work requirements); and (b) possibly those at the 
lower end of the spectrum (e.g., the hard-to-serve).  These issues are both discussed in more detail under the 
“targeting outcomes” section below.  
 
Box 1 – Incentive Effects of Means-Testing 
Much attention has been given to the potential negative incentive effects 
of income testing on labor market participation.  Discincentives to 
work can be created if benefits are reduced as earned incomes rise.   
Indeed, reducing such negative incentives and their potential for creating 
a poverty trap, is what has motivated many of the changes under the 1996 
welfare reforms, including (a)  work requirements; (b) higher earnings 
disregards (the amounts of earned income that is not counted for 
eligibility); and (c) higher income thresholds and continued eligibility for 
non-cash benefits (food stamps, Medicaid) for TANF beneficiaries when 
they become ineligible for TANF due to higher incomes.   
Relatively less attention has been given in international literature to the 
potential effects of asset testing on savings among the poor.  Asset tests 
have been used to assure that assistance does not go to people with ample 
resources of their own.  Empirical evidence from several studies on 
beneficiaries of various welfare programs suggests that asset tests may 
reduce savings by lower-income families.
20     15







Asset Test  Income Criteria  Maximum Income 
Threshold 
Maximum Benefits 






• Family definition 






or other caretaker 
• Can exclude 
members of the 
household for 
whom AU is not 
applying for 
assistance (e.g., 
if some members 
don’t fit the 
citizenship 
criteria) 
• AU must include 
a child 
• Most non-




• Some states use 
own funds for 
eligible non-
citizens 
• Citizen rules 
apply to 
individuals not 
families (so some 
members may be 
eligible while 
others ineligible) 
• No federal limits 
• State-established limits 
on financial assets: 
$1,000-$10,000 
depending on state 
• Vehicles: state option; 
most states disregard 
value up to close to 
$5000 for one vehicle 
• No federal criteria 
• States define 
definition of income 
used (earned, 
unearned, which 
members’ income to 
count, disregards) 
• States determine the 
type of income test 
performed: gross 
income, gross 
earnings, net income.  
These tests are in 
addition to the 
implicit income test 
imposed by benefit 
calculation procedure 
• No federal criteria 
• States define the 
thresholds 
• Thresholds depend on 
family size 
• Average annual 
income threshold for a 
family of 3 in 1999:  
o  $8340 
o  Or 60% of the 
FPL 
• Annual income 
thresholds range from 
$2460 in Alabama to 
$19692 in Hawaii (per 
year for a family of 3, 
1999) 
• These thresholds 
represent between 18-
123% of FPL for a 
family of 3 (1999) 
• No federal criteria 
• States define benefits 
• Depends on family 
size 
• Average maximum 
benefit for family of 
3 in 1999: 
o  $4,884  
o  Or 35% of the 
FPL 
• Range from $1,968 
in Alabama to 
$11,076 in Alaska 
(per year for a family 
of three, 1999) 
• This range represents 










• A person or 







• All households 
eligible (even 






• Federal limits 
• Financial assets <$2000 
for non-elderly, <$3000 
for elderly 
• Vehicles: federal criteria 
– certain vehicles 
completely exempt (e.g. 
if used for work).  If not 
exempt, all but $4,650 of 
the fair market value 
(FMV) of one vehicle is 
counted toward the asset 
limit.   
• States may substitute 
TANF rules as of 
07/01/01. 
• Federal criteria 
• Gross and net income 
tests depending on 
household size 
• Various deductions: 
o  20% of earned 
income 
o  $134 for all HH 
o  For medical 
expenses >$35  




o  Shelter costs 
o  Child care costs 
• Federal criteria 
• Depends on 
household size 
• Limits for family of 
three (2003): 
o  Gross: $19,536 (or 
128% of FPL) 
o  Net: $15,024 (or 
99% of FPL) 
• Federal criteria 
• Depends on 
household size 
• Calculated as 
Maximum Allotment 
minus 30% of net 
income (because 
beneficiaries 
expected to spend 
30% of own 
resources on food) 
• Maximum Allotment 
for a family of 3 (per 
year in 2003): 
o  $4,392 
o  Or 29% of FPL   16
 
 







Asset Test  Income Criteria  Maximum Income 
Threshold 
Maximum Benefits 






• Based on AFDC 
definitions
a 
• States have 
flexibility to 
define family or 
household and 
those for whom 
income and 
















o  Those 
receiving SSI 







o  Other special 
groups 
• Legal immigrants 
ineligible for 5 
years 
• State option but can’t be 
more restrictive than 
AFDC rules 
• States have the option to 
raise the limit or 
eliminate the asset test 
completely 
• Vehicles: Many states 
disregard the value of 
one vehicle up to $4,650 
or one vehicle 
• States determine 
calculation of income, 





• Anyone meeting 
AFDC eligibility as of 
1996 eligible 
• Federal criteria 
• Children < 6 years 
and pregnant women 
whose family income 
is < 133% of FPL 
• In some states can be 
higher if approved by 
certain dates 
• Health care costs  
Sources: Compiled by author drawing on information from: Rowe, Gretchen (November 2000).  “Welfare Rules Databook: State TANF policies as of July 1999.”  Urban Institute;  GAO (November 
2001).  Means-tested Programs: Determining Financial Eligibility is Cumbersome and Can Be Simplified.  GAO-02-58; Burke, Vee (November 2001).  “Cash and Noncash Benefits for Persons with 
Limited Income: Eligibility Rules, Recipient and Expenditure Data, FY1998-2000.  Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress; and HHS/OFA and USDA/FNS websites 
a.\ Medicaid eligibility for children and families is still based upon AFDC standards and methodologies (even though AFDC was eliminated when TANF introduced).   
FPL = federal poverty line (from Federal Register)   17
 
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY: APPLICATIONS PROCESSES
22 
Applications for eligibility for social assistance programs in the US are made on a permanent “on-demand 
basis,” meaning that entry into welfare programs is essentially available to anyone, anywhere, and at any 
time provided that they apply and meet the eligibility criteria (Box 2).  Most states have integrated the 
application process for TANF, food stamps and Medicaid, but applicants can also apply for each program 
separately.   
 
Since applications are handled by local offices throughout the country, overall, there is considerable variation 
in such processes.  Depending on the policies of the state and county, this process can be relatively simple 
and straightforward, or it can be much more complex, involving numerous steps and visits to various 
agencies (Box 3).
23  The processes are typically detailed in lengthy operations manuals (binders), prepared by 
state and local offices.
24   
 
Nonetheless, typical steps involved in applying for the traditional welfare package (TANF, food stamps, and 
Medicaid) include:  
 
•  Reception/Intake.   The initial point of contact with the welfare system typically occurs with the 
reception/intake clerk in the reception area of the local welfare office.  Receptionists/intake 
clerks provide blank applications, receive completed applications,
25 and answer general 
questions.  In some offices, receptionists also conduct initial screenings to determine which types 
of assistance they need, want, and might be eligible for.  (See below for information on 
applications).   
•  Initial Screening.  Initial screenings are also common, and serve many purposes including: (a) 
entering initial application data into computer system and generating a client identification 
number (see below); (b) determining the need for expedited food stamps or other emergency 
Box 2 - Two Distinguishing Features for Program Access: US vs. LAC 
Two key features distinguish access to the US safety net from social assistance programs in many Latin American countries.  
The first is “permanent access” and the second is “on-demand applications.”  In the US, entry into welfare programs is 
essentially available to anyone, anywhere, and at any time provided they apply and meet the eligibility criteria.  Consideration 
for entry is essentially done on an “on-demand” basis, whereby potential beneficiaries apply for consideration of eligibility on 
their own initiative, with some screening themselves out if they perceive that the time costs of application outweigh the 
potential benefits of approval.     
In contrast, in Latin America, entry into many social assistance programs is limited over time.  Consideration for entry into the 
programs is commonly carried out during a single round of surveying and eligibility testing of a particular area, usually under 
the limits of a rationed household quota.   This massive review of households for eligibility is implemented once a year, or 
even once every few years.  Although some households can request consideration for applications at other times, most access 
is limited to those who were considered during the survey sweep.  This means that if a household gets on the beneficiary list, it 
remains on that list for quite sometime (years), since updating occurs infrequently.  It also means that if a household is 
excluded from the list at the time of the single round of screening, or if a household later “falls” into poverty, that family is 
shut out of the program (even when it is deserving of the benefits).  As such, errors of exclusion and inclusion will likely grow 
over time.  It also means that the programs are not really serving as a “safety net” to catch people when they fall, but rather 
provide long-term assistance for a subset of the deserving poor (with fairly extensive welfare dependency).   
Two key inputs make “permanent and on-going access” to US welfare programs possible.  The first is financing.  The budgets 
of the main US welfare programs have been adequate enough to ensure financing of benefit levels for all who apply and are 
deemed eligible.  When budget cuts are enacted, the auxiliary support services that complement the transfers are the activities 
that take the hit, rather than the number of beneficiaries or levels of transfers themselves.   
The second is physical access to the programs.  The physical network of welfare offices is extensive enough so that virtually 
all of the population can apply without prohibitively lengthy transport time or costs.  Applications by mail and on-line also 
expand the ability of potential beneficiaries to apply (though most offices require some face-to-face contact for eligibility 
determination, as discussed below).     18
services; (c) conducting an up-front assessment for the purpose of diverting applicants from 
TANF to other programs (e.g., one-time cash payments in lieu of welfare, unemployment, 
disability); (d) informing customers of key features of the programs, conditionalities, and the 
types of documentation they will need to submit; and (e) simplifying and shortening the 
eligibility interview.  In Montgomery County, Maryland, these initial screenings usually take 
about ten minutes.   
•  Group Orientation.  It is also common to require applicants to attend a group orientation to learn 
about program rules and expectations, particularly for TANF applicants.  In Montgomery 
County, Maryland, for example, group orientations are conducted on the same day as 
reception/intake and initial screenings.  Group orientations provide an efficient way to 
communicate standard information to (rules, conditionalities, expectations), and go over basic 
documentation with, a group of 7-10 customers per day (rather than repeating the entire process 
one-on-one).  During this group orientation, every customer is required to read and sign a 
Personal Responsibility Plan as part of the TANF application process.  This form explains the 
goals of the program (employment, financial independence), as well as key features such as work 
requirements, lifetime time limits (5 year limit total in USA), and welfare avoidance grant 
(WAG) alternatives.  Customers are also informed
26 about up-front requirements for TANF.  
During group orientation, customers are also given an appointment for an eligibility interview, 
along with a computer-generated client identification number and information about 
documentation needed for the interview.  These group orientation sessions usually last about 45 
minutes to an hour.   
•  Up-Front Requirements.  Many offices have certain up-front requirements that applicants must 
fulfill even before eligibility determination.  These can include: (a) mandatory registration in 
work activities as part of a “work first” policy (e.g., registration with employment services 
agencies);
27 (b) substance abuse screening (with trained specialists); (c) mandatory cooperation 
with child-support searches (with court clerks);
28 (d) finger imaging and photographing;
29 and/or 
(e) home visits.  In Montgomery County, Maryland, for example, all applicants must register 
with the employment services agency and those without certified barriers must begin serving the 
40-hours per week work requirement within five days of their initial application – well before 
eligibility determination.   
•  Eligibility Interview.  Face-to-face interviews are required for TANF and food stamps in most 
states, and typically (although not always) requires applicants to make an additional trip to the 
welfare office.
30  Eligibility interviews are conducted by trained case workers who conduct a 
needs assessment,
31 review applications and documentation.  Case workers also take the 
opportunity to resolve any unclear, inconsistent or missing information (often prompted by a 
computer that guides them on additional information needed) and run cross-checks as 
information is entered in real-time during the interview.  Case workers are also responsible for 
verification (see below).  The interview also offers the opportunity for the case worker and the 
client to explore alternatives to welfare, develop a mutually-agreed upon “independence plan,” 
which outlines the family’s goals, steps to achieve the goals, and responsibilities of the applicant 
and the local department to implement those steps.  In this way, the role of the case worker often 
extends far beyond simple eligibility determination, but also attempts to create an atmosphere of 
trust, mentoring, and coaching.  These interviews usually take about ___ minutes.  
•  Eligibility Decisions. Once all steps, documentation and verifications (see below) are complete, 
the customer is informed in writing of the decision to either award or deny benefits. Decisions 
and issuance of payments (pro-rated back to the date of application) are typically made within a 
certain required time period (e.g., 30 days). 
In addition, the programs establish clear requirements for updating information (re-certification).  Updates 
to eligibility occur in two ways.  First, beneficiaries are required to continually provide information to   19
welfare offices about changes in their circumstances, including changes in: household composition (death, 
birth, someone leaving or joining the family), address or shelter costs, assets, expenses, and income (earned 
and unearned).   Penalties are levied on households that do not report such changes within a certain time 
period (usually 10 days), and specific forms are provided for reporting changes in circumstances.   
Second, beneficiaries must undergo a complete re-certification on a periodic basis.  Re-certification involves 
a complete re-review of all technical and financial eligibility criteria and supporting documentation 
(verification, see below).  For food stamps, federal criteria establish 12-month eligibility periods (except if all 
household members are elderly or disabled, in which case they are extended to 24 months), after which 
households must be re-certified.
32  Some states, however, have implemented shorter eligibility periods – 
requiring more frequent re-certification for all or some more “error prone” households (those whose 
circumstances change more frequently).
33  States have taken such measures as a way to improve target 
accuracy, reduce their “error rates” and potential liability for financial penalties by the federal government 
(see below), since more regular updating of beneficiary information is likely to reduce errors.  For TANF, re-
certification periods vary by state, and usually depend on the type of household involved.  For example, in 
Maryland, re-certification is required only on an annual (12 month) basis for child-only cases or cases in 
which the household head or other adult is actively working on his or her “independence plan” (work 
requirements) with regular contact with case workers.  Most households are required to be re-certified every 
six months, however, and some (e.g., those with substance abuse problems) must be re-certified every four 
months.   
Finally, applicants have the right to appeal rejected applications for benefits under US safety net programs.  
Applicants have the right to know the reason for their rejection, and to a “fair hearing” for contested cases.  
The right to appeals and fair hearings are communicated to applicants during the intake process and clear 
guidelines are provided to applicants and local welfare offices as to the procedures for appeals and hearings.  
Typically there is a time-bound period in which applicants must contest their cases.   
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BOX 3 – EXAMPLE WELFARE APPLICATION PROCESSES BY OFFICE 
Seattle, Washington 
Arlington, Virginia 
Montgomery County, Maryland 
New York, New York 
* WR = Work Registration (for TANF only), CSS = Child Support Search, SAS = Substance Abuse Screening.  Sources: Holcomb et.al. (January 2003) plus author’s   21
VERIFYING ELIGIBILITY 
Eligibility for social assistance programs is subject to extensive verifications.  Such verifications cover 
various aspects of eligibility, including client identity and information provided on assets and incomes.   
Verification takes many forms, including the provision of documents, computer matches through automated 
systems, and, in some cases, additional “detective work” by case workers to track down information via 
phone calls and personal contacts.   
 
Verifying and Tracking Client Identity 
At the most basic level, verifying and tracking client identity is crucial to avoid duplications in payments, 
fraud or other errors in processing.  The states and counties use several tools to track and verify identity: 
 
•  Traditional approach: computer matches of applicant characteristics and identification 
numbers. One of the first steps in the application process is to identify the applicant and whether or 
not the applicant is “known to the system” under a previous application.  This process involves 
obtaining basic identifying information about the applicant: name, age, date of birth, sex, race, social 
security number (Box 4), driver’s 
license,
34 address, citizen status, and 
so forth.  This information is entered 
into the welfare information system 
database during the application 
process.  The system then runs checks 
against all other applicants / 
beneficiaries in the system to see if 
there are any matches of identity or 
“near” matches (e.g., similar but not 
identical social security numbers).   
The system identifies all “hits”(other 
applicants with similar 
characteristics) and the case worker 
compares these to the applicant.  If 
the applicant is confirmed to be new 
to the system, the computer assigns that applicant two numbers: (a) a “soundex” number that is based 
on the characteristics provided (a meaningful number that helps the computer identify the applicant 
based on such characteristics.  This “soundex” number is only used internally in the information 
system (it is not given to the client); and (b) a formal client identification number that identifies the 
applicant with related numbers for all “co-applicants”(household/family members) to establish the 
assistance unit.  This client identification number is shared with the applicant (who must use the 
number as a reference for future communications about his/her application and benefits).   
Citizenship status and social security numbers are also verified during this phase.   
•  New Approaches: Biometric Technology and Digital Fingerprinting.  Nine states have begun 
using biometric information (primarily digital fingerprinting)
35 to identify applicants and reduce 
fraud (e.g., from people receiving welfare benefits under more than one name,  providing false 
documents, or from people falsely claiming benefits on behalf of others).
36  Connecticut has 
apparently saved some $9 million from 1996-98 by using a biometric fingerprint identification 
system to spot welfare fraud (the system itself has cost the state some $5 million over three years).
37  
The fingerprints, along with a digital facial portrait and signature, are stored in a database and cross-
checked against others in the database.  The process takes no more than five minutes per person, and 
the applicant, in turn, receives a tamper-proof, secure photo identification card.
38  The gathering of 
this information is subject to state confidentiality rules and the information cannot be used for other 
Box 4 - Social Security Numbers 
In the absence of a national identification card, most programs 
require the provision of a social security number (SSN) for all 
members of the household (e.g., in the case of food stamps) or all 
members of the unit applying for assistance (e.g., assistance unit, 
in the case of TANF).  Since some applicants may lack social 
security numbers, intake workers and case managers assist 
applicants in obtaining these numbers.  In cases where an 
individual possesses more than one SSN, he/she must provide all 
the numbers and the case worker must document the situation.   
Social security numbers must be verified by case managers.   
Social security numbers are then used (along with other basic 
characteristics) to determine if the system “knows” the customers 
previously.  They are also used to run “matches” with other 
information systems to cross check information.   22
purposes.  Similar systems have been developed in California, Arizona, Illinois, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas as a way to create a unique identification system for all 
applicants and beneficiaries.   
 
Verifying Income and Asset Information 
Extensive efforts are made to verify information provided on income and assets.  Two tools are generally 
used for verification purposes: documentation and computer matches.  During the interview, the case 
manager typically explains to the customer the types of verification that will be conducted, and identifies 
what documentation will be needed (giving a deadline – usually 10 days – to return verification documents).  
Case workers are required to follow up and investigate all “questionable information” (e.g., inconsistent 
information on expenses and incomes).  All relevant “notes” on the process must be narrated and entered into 
the applicant’s computer file.
39   
 
Documentation.  In addition to their SSN, proof of identity, household composition and proof of address, 
applicants must provide extensive documentation to verify incomes, assets, and expenditures.  For income 
(earned and unearned), such documentation generally covers the past two months and include documents 
such as: pay stubs, employer wage statements, benefit letters from other programs (social security, 
unemployment compensation, pensions, etc.), employer letters, etc.  For assets (cash or non-cash), such 
documentation must include the applicant’s most recent banking statements (savings and checking), value of 
stocks or bonds, life insurance policies, vehicle documentation, etc.  For expenses, applicants must provide 
documents on: shelter costs, most recent utility bills (gas, electricity, water), written statement of child care 
costs, real estate tax bills, recent medical bills, and child support payments made by the applicant.  Such 
documentation helps confirm the income, asset and expense information provided verbally by the applicant, 
prevent fraud or misstatement, and reduce errors.   
 
Computer Matches.  The use of computer matching systems has increased dramatically over the past 
decade (see also discussion of automated systems below). Although the welfare reforms of 1996 no longer 
mandate most computer matches, most states still use them because they help prevent errors and improve 
target accuracy.  Indeed, the use of computer matching systems has almost doubled since 1991.  At that time, 
the average number of system matches was about 7.5; it is currently about 14.
40  Just some examples of 
computer matches that are commonly performed by states include:
41 
 
•  The Department of Labor’s New Hires Registry, which provides information about individuals 
who are newly employed (name, SSN, employer’s name and address, first day of work, salary, pay 
frequency).  Matches typically run automatically by automated information systems (see below) on a 
daily basis. 
•  Income Eligibility Verification System (EIVS), which conducts matches to verify household 
income using several databases: (a) information from the Beneficiary and Earnings Data Exchange 
(BENDEX) operated by the Social Security Administration (SSA), which provides information on 
social security benefits, private pensions, out-of-state wages, veterans and other government benefits, 
and self-employment; (b) the State Data Exchange, also operated by SSA, which provides 
information on SSI customers; (c) SSN verification with SSA; and (d) the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), including information on assets, unearned income, earnings, and gambling winnings, all as 
reported to the IRS.
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•  Department of Motor Vehicles databases, to help verify identity, address information, vehicle asset 
information. 
•  Within State Automated Benefits Systems.  Most state’s operate automated systems to verify 
employment and payments of benefits within each state, including: employment and wage 
information, payment of unemployment insurance, etc.     23
•  SSA’s Death Match, which matches against national death records to detect the possible collection 
of benefits for deceased individuals (a federally mandated match). 
•  Prisoner Verification System, which matches against the databases of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons to check for prisoners receiving benefits (not eligible) (a federally mandated match).   
•  Child Support database, to identify information on applicants not reporting child support income. 
•  Bank match, to match with bank records maintained by the Treasury Department for asset and 
eligibility information. 
•  State Lottery Winners database for asset information. 
•  Systematic Alien Verification Eligibility (SAVE) system operated by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service to track immigration status of applicants.   
 
Improvements in technology have greatly increased state capabilities for matching.  States can now send 
cases to be matched and can receive match results via communications networks rather than by traditional 
shipping of CDs, disks and magnetic tapes.  These advances have led to much more rapid responses from 
external databases.  For example, 38% of all matches can now be accessed on line (vs. 12.5% in 1991), many 
agencies have developed common interfaces to various databases allowing single queries for multiple 
matches (e.g., SSA databases, EIVS, etc.), and most states have greatly improved the degree of within-state 
automation (as discussed below).
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ERRORS IN ELIGIBILITY: QUALITY CONTROL AND FRAUD 
The US has invested many efforts to reduce eligibility errors – both intentional and non-intentional.  Non-
intentional errors from innocuous mistakes by recipients, eligibility workers, or computer programmers in 
computing income, assets and benefit levels.  Intentional errors arise when recipients hide or provide 
incorrect information to receive benefits or apply for benefits under more than one name or in more than one 
state.  The government (federal and state) have invested significant resources to monitor and control both 
kinds of efforts, particularly for the food stamps program.  Moreover, under the food stamps program, 
financial incentives (sanctions) are imposed against both the states (for non-intentional clerical errors) and 
individuals (for intentional fraud) to provide incentives to reduce such errors.  The states in turn use these 
error rates to measure the performance of local offices and individual workers.
44 
 
Quality Control and “Error Rates”: Strong Emphasis of the Food Stamps Program 
A thorough system of “quality control” has been developed to monitor and reduce errors in eligibility.   
Quality control (QC) is mandated by the Federal Government for the food stamps program to ensure that 
federal funds are spent appropriately (since food stamps are entirely federally funded).  This emphasis on QC 
is consistent with the emphasis of the food stamps program on eligibility as a key indicator of success.  
Indeed, the accuracy data generated by QC provide the main indicators of program performance for the food 
stamps program.   
 
Quality Control measures the accuracy of states’ eligibility decisions and benefit calculations.  Each month, 
the states randomly select a specified number of cases from two “sample frames.” The first is a sample of all 
cases that were issued benefits in a given month (known as “active cases”).  The second is a sample of cases 
that were denied benefits, or whose benefits were terminated, in a given month (referred to as “negative 
cases”).  Nationwide, the states review random samples of about 50,000 active and 30,000 negative cases 
each year.
45  The Federal Government then conducts a random re-review of about 30% of this QC sample to 
verify that the state’s QC review was conducted appropriately.   
   24
The purpose of “active case” reviews is to determine whether the household was eligible and whether it 
received the correct amount of food stamp benefits in that month.  For active cases, the state’s quality control 
reviewers conduct both detailed examinations of the case file and in-depth field reviews, including an 
interview with an adult member of the household as well as contact with other persons (such as landlords or 
employers) with knowledge of the household’s circumstances. If the QC reviewer determines that the 
household received an incorrect allotment, the case is cited with an “error” in the dollar amount of the 
incorrect payment.  Two types of errors are calculated: (a) overpayment errors,
46 which count the benefits 
issued to ineligible households plus those issued to eligible households in excess of the appropriate benefit 
level (depending on household size and incomes); and (b) underpayment errors, which measure errors in 
which eligible households received fewer benefits than they were eligible to receive (it does not include the 
value of benefits that should have been paid to households that were denied or terminated from the program). 
These errors are then added (not netted) to yield the “combined error rate” (as a share of total benefits paid 
that month).
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“Negative case” reviews determine the share of wrongly classified ineligible or wrongly terminated cases in 
the total caseload.  They are less rigorous, usually consisting of a desk review of the eligibility case worker’s 
case record.
48  Negative case errors are computed in terms of cases (individuals) not benefits (dollar 
amounts).   
 
The food stamps program attaches financial incentives to target accuracy.  States are subject to financial 
sanctions if their combined error rate (overpayment + underpayment) is higher than the national average.  
Conversely, they can receive enhanced administrative funding if their combined error rate is below 6% and 
they do not have a high negative case error rate.  This means that even if all states make progress in reducing 
their error rates, roughly half of all states can expect financial penalties if their rates are higher than the 
national average.  In 2002, the average national combined error rate was 9.9%, and states paid federal 
penalties of about $46 million (see section on Targeting Outcomes below for additional discussion of error 
rates).
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Controlling Fraud 
Any safety net program of the magnitude of those in the US (both in terms of total dollars and in terms of the 
size of the actual benefits per recipient) will be subject to fraud and abuse.  Fraud  -- or “intentional program 
violations” (IPV) – occurs when applicants or recipients intentionally misrepresent information on their 
identities, incomes, or assets to claim benefits.  Types of fraud observed in US safety net programs include: 
(a) intentional withholding or misrepresenting of information to receive benefits; (b) persons applying for 
multiple benefits under more than one name; (c)  persons applying for benefits in more than one state; 
(d) persons collecting benefits on behalf of deceased individuals; (e) prisoners collecting benefits (they’re not 
eligible); and (e) “trafficking” of food stamps (using them for purposes other than food or exchanging them 
for cash).
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By its very covert nature, the extent of fraud is difficult if not impossible to quantify.  Some studies have 
turned up the following estimates based on analysis of samples (of states, beneficiaries – hence not nationally 
representative): (a) at least 20,000 individuals were counted as receiving multiple food stamps benefits in at 
least two states in 1996 (study of four states), collecting an estimated $3.9 million in food stamp benefits (in 
those four states alone);
51 (b) some 12,138 prison inmates collected some $3.5 million in food stamp benefits 
(in four states alone) in 1995;
52 (c)  some 26,000 deceased individuals in four states were included in 
households receiving food stamps over two years (1995-1996), collecting an estimated $8.5 million in 
improper food stamps payments;
53 and (d)  the USDA estimates that some $815 million in food stamps 
(approximately 4% of total food stamps payments) were illegally traded for cash at retail stores (known as 
“trafficking”) in 1993.
54  While fraud also occurs under the TANF program (as with any program to some 
degree), the issue has been less analyzed (given the relatively higher emphasis on eligibility accuracy under 
the food stamps program).    25
 
The federal and state governments have developed numerous measures and systems to control fraud.  These 
include many of the issues discussed elsewhere in this paper, including: (a) quality control audits under the 
food stamps program; (b) technologies and procedures to verify identity (applicant characteristic “matches” 
and biometric technologies such as fingerprinting); (c) verifications of income and asset information; (d) 
computer matches using automated systems, including for income, identity, deceased individuals, prisoners, 
duplicate participation, etc.; and (e) negative incentives for those who are caught, such as repaying the 
erroneous benefits, program disqualification (permanent or temporary depending on the severity of the 
infraction), and possible criminal enforcement mechanisms.
55  Local welfare offices also typically have a 
fraud investigator as part of their staff.   
 
AUTOMATED WELFARE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
56 
Given the complexity of the application, eligibility determination, and verification processes, automated 
systems have become an indispensable tool for the management and implementation of welfare programs in 
the US.  Much of the eligibility process is assisted by automated computer information systems.  Such 
systems have greatly facilitated beneficiary registry, eligibility determination, benefits calculations, 
verifications, and payments issuance.  Indeed, billions of dollars have been invested in such systems in the 
US since the 1980s.
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Even with these investments, there is no single national database for beneficiaries of welfare programs.  This 
reflects the history, fragmentation and decentralization of the social safety net in the U.S.   While 
decentralization allows the states to tailor their systems to their specific priorities and program 
configurations, the lack of a national beneficiary registry involves several drawbacks, particularly in the 
context of the post-reform welfare system, as discussed in more detail below.   
 
In lieu of a national system, the states (and in some cases counties)
58 have each developed their own 
automated welfare information systems.  Systems development generally began in the 1970s, well before the 
current post-reform welfare system was designed.   In most states, these early systems were developed 
separately for specific welfare programs (cash transfers (AFDC), food stamps and Medicaid eligibility 
determination). In fact, by 1993, 52 (of 54) states and territories indicated they were operating multiple 
automated systems – ranging from 2 to 12 different systems -- to support their various programs.
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The fragmented development of separate (rather than integrated) state automated systems for the various 
welfare programs reflects in part the historical funding arrangements between states and the Federal 
Government.  The Federal Government has historically shared the cost of state-based development of 
automated systems, with the federal government providing enhanced funding in many cases (e.g., more than 
50%) but the cost-sharing arrangement has been bureaucratic and cumbersome but with few guarantees of 
cost limits or quality.  Federal funds have been channeled through different funding streams with different 
and varying cost-shares, representing the fragmentation of the federal safety net across three main programs: 
TANF/AFDC and Medicaid under the Department of Health and Human Services and food stamps under the 
USDA.  To obtain federal co-financing of these systems, states had to follow an Advance Planning 
Document (APD) process, submitting detailed plans to develop and implement the systems.  If a system were 
to be used for more than one program (desired integration), separate APDs had to be submitted for each 
program with the development costs pro-rated and allocated to each program.  Each federal agency then had 
to monitor development and operation of the systems to make sure each agency’s requirements were met.  
These policies complicated states’ attempts to integrate automated systems across programs.  While the APD 
process remains in place for Medicaid and food stamps, it was abolished for TANF and states may now use 
whatever portion of their capped federal TANF block grand funds they wish for developing and operating 
systems.  However, no legislatively mandated ceilings exist to specifically limit federal funding of systems 
supporting Medicaid and food stamps.   
   26
Despite the lack of a national system or registry, the federal government did work to provide guidance to the 
states in the development of their automated systems.  In fact, the federal Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) developed a general system to improve the capability of states to administer welfare 
programs.  Known as “FAMIS” (Family Assistance Management Information System), this general system 
sought to enable states to better control and account for all factors in the eligibility determination process, as 
well as the costs, quality and delivery of benefits and services to program participants.  By 1993, 32 states 
has been certified as meeting FAMIS functional requirements, with most others in various stages of 
developing their FAMIS systems.   
 
A stop-gap measure has been developed through the use of the Public Assistance Information System 
(PARIS).  PARIS serves as a periodic (not continuous or real-time) inter-state matching process co-
sponsored by HHS and the Veteran’s Administration (VA).  States submit caseloads to the VIA, which 
combines all the state files and reports back to each affected state any household members that are present on 
other state files and remaining time of eligibility.
60  Nonetheless, even with these measures, state systems 
remain incompatible across states.   
 
What Automated Welfare Information Systems Do 
 
Most state automated welfare information systems perform a standard set of functions, though the particular 
structure, design and functioning of these systems differs across the states.  Moreover, most states have 
managed to integrate eligibility determination under these systems for at least the traditional package of 
welfare programs (TANF, food stamps, Medicaid). These functions include: 
 
•  Determining intake and on-going eligibility.  With the complexity of eligibility requirements for 
the various welfare programs, most states and counties rely on automated systems to assist case 
workers in determining eligibility, both at initial intake and on an on-going basis (for 
recertifications).  As discussed above, these automated systems prompt case workers for key 
information, run cross-checks, and use the entered data to calculate eligibility for the various 
programs.   
•  Verifying eligibility and information.  An important function of automated systems is their ability 
to interface with other databases to run computer matches for the purposes of verifying information 
and eligibility (as discussed above).  This can help reduce errors and fraud, thereby reducing the 
costs of the various programs.   
•  Recording applicant case histories.  The automated systems likewise serve as an archiving tool to 
register applicant information and store historical data.  Such information is then updated and 
augmented as the customers are denied, approved and pass through the system.  As such, the systems 
serve as an applicant registry, covering both beneficiaries and non-beneficiary applicants.   
•  Calculating benefit levels.  Since the benefit levels for TANF and food stamps depends on complex 
calculations based on family composition, incomes and needs (as discussed above), automated 
systems have proved quite useful in performing such calculations.   
•  Triggering payment issuance.  Virtually all state automated systems trigger the issuance of 
payments, which is now usually done through links between the automated systems and the banking 
system which issues payments via electronic benefit transfers (EBTs), usually on a monthly schedule 
according to the alphabetical order of the beneficiary’s family name.
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•  Supporting case management.
62  Case workers also use automated systems to help with case 
management and maintenance.  Some of the supports provided by such systems include: scheduling 
appointments (for initial interviews and recertification updates), monitoring other benefits awarded 
to clients, tracking client use of complementary services, tracking the status of applicant and   27
beneficiary cases, monitoring progress of beneficiaries in work activities, though some of these 
capabilities are deficient, as discussed below.   
•  Monitoring conditionality compliance.  Some automated systems are being upgraded to allow case 
workers and program planners the ability to monitor compliance of beneficiaries with key program 
conditionalities, such as the federal work participation requirement or other state-imposed health and 
education conditionalities (see above).  For example, the State of Wisconsin is currently upgrading 
its system to reflect the state’s strong emphasis on tracking TANF recipients’ progress towards 
economic independence by providing information on work participation activities, post-TANF 
earnings, job entry and retention rates, etc.  The State of Maryland’s Client Automated Resource and 
Eligibility System (Maryland CARES) has interfaces with (a) the state Department of Education to 
monitor school attendance, which is a state-level condition for benefits; and (b)  the Work 
Opportunities Management Information System (WOMIS), which tracks compliance with work 
participation requirements.   
•  Supporting service planning.
63  Automated welfare information systems also provide information 
on the characteristics and case loads of welfare recipients to help program managers (state and local) 
in planning.  Nonetheless, as discussed below, some important gaps exist in the ability of automated 
systems to provide information needed for service planning.   
•  Monitoring program performance.
64  Automated systems have increasingly been called upon to 
generate information needed to monitor key performance benchmarks, such as work participation 
rates, diversion of potential welfare recipients to other services (discussed above), and use of other 
programs after leaving welfare.  Time limits are another key performance benchmark, though the 
ability of automated systems to provide necessary information on this indicator is limited, as 
discussed below.   
•  Supporting statistical reporting.  Automated systems also provide data necessary for federal and 
state financial and statistical reporting, program planning, budget preparation, and program 
evaluations.   
 
Systems’ Success as Tool for Eligibility, Accuracy 
The initial objectives of automated systems were to increase the accuracy of eligibility determinations and 
benefit calculations, reduce error rates, and detect and deter fraud and abuse in major entitlement programs.  
For the most part, these systems did succeed in helping achieve these objectives, as discussed below in the 
section on Targeting Outcomes and above in the section on fraud and error rates.   
 
Challenges Facing Automated Welfare Information Systems 
The 1996 reforms brought about sweeping changes in the complexity of welfare programs and reporting 
requirements, in particular with the shift in emphasis from income maintenance to self-sufficiency.  These 
changes in turn have had profound implications for the information needs of states and the automated 
systems designed to meet those needs.  Although the automated systems in most states support these needs in 
many ways, most present major limitations in (a) meeting the needs of the post-reform welfare system; and 
(b) their use as a performance management tool.   
 
Automated Systems, Service Delivery, and the Implementation of Welfare Reforms.   Most states 
automated systems were developed in the 1970s and 1980s
65 -- well before the advent of the 1996 reforms.  
As such, many were designed for a more “passive” welfare policy, whereby “need is a circumstance that aid 
in and of itself alleviates” (poverty alleviation and income maintenance).
66 As discussed above, passive 
public assistance systems emphasize current transactions: eligibility is reviewed and benefits paid 
accordingly, independent of previous payments, actions, or assessments.  Such was the system under AFDC 
prior to the 1996 reforms.  As such, most automated welfare information systems simply conducted   28
eligibility screening and issued payments accordingly, with little regard to the actions of beneficiaries, past or 
present.  The post-reform scenario, however, was dramatically altered, serving more as an “active” public 
assistance system, in which “need is treated as a situation that aid alters” (poverty reduction and self-
sufficiency).  Active welfare systems emphasize history and case management: situations are diagnosed, 
treatments are prescribed, behaviors monitored (conditionalities), and outcomes (changes in situation) are 
observed in real time.  What happens next is very much a function of what came before.  The implication is 
that automated systems must include not only current actions, but also transactions histories.   
 
Such is the challenge facing the states under the post-reform welfare system.  Specifically, the new “active” 
system requires states to (a)  enforce federally-mandated time limits; (b)  track compliance with program 
conditionalities (work requirements, and in some cases, other conditionalities such as school attendance) that 
would ultimately bring about behavioral changes to help beneficiaries reach self-sufficiency (poverty 
reduction); and (c) work across programs and social services using a more extensive case management 
approach.  These central aspects of the post-reform welfare system present significant challenges for 
automated information systems.     
 
The lack of a national beneficiary database completely undermines the enforcement of time limits, a central 
tenet of welfare reforms.  As discussed above, federal law imposes a lifetime time limit of 5 years of benefits 
from cash assistance (TANF).  Time limits also apply to certain beneficiaries for food stamps.  Such limits 
apply whether or not the benefits were paid in Maryland, Virginia or both.  However, state automated 
systems have no way of interfacing across states and there is no national database to facilitate cross-state 
verification of previous payment of benefits (though policy makers are exploring the possibility of 
constructing one, as discussed below).  As such, states either do not collect such data or rely on TANF clients 
to disclose this information (with little likely reliability due to the incentives involved).
67  During site visits 
conducted for the preparation of this paper, officials in Maryland (both state and local) repeatedly mentioned 
the apparently common occurrence of former beneficiaries of welfare in New York migrating to Maryland in 
search of continued benefits.  True to their predictions, during our observations of intake and screening in 
Montgomery County, one couple applying for benefits inadvertently revealed to the case worker that they 
had just moved from New York.  The case worker discovered they had indeed been receiving benefits there.  
The enforcement of time limits – one of the central tenets of the post-reform welfare system -- should not 
rely on such haphazard revelations.   
 
The lack of inter-state interfaces or a national database can also result in payment of duplicate benefits.  
Duplicate participation is a concern across all means-tested programs, but is particularly problematic with the 
imposition of time limits.  In August 1998, the General Accounting Office published the results of an 
investigation of interstate duplicate food stamp benefits in California, Texas, Florida and New York, finding 
over 20,000 duplicate individuals and an overpayment of nearly $4 million in those states alone.
68  
Nonetheless, as with the enforcement of time limits, there is currently no automated way for states to track 
the payment of interstate duplicate benefits (state-wide automated systems have, however, significantly 
reduced the payment of duplicate benefits within states).   
 
The post-reform welfare policy also requires states to implement program conditionalities designed to help 
beneficiaries escape from poverty, most notably the work participation requirements.  Other states also 
impose state-specific conditionalities, such as those for school attendance.  The implementation of these 
conditionalities requires coordination and communication across agencies and services, from the welfare case 
manager to those involved in the provision of employment and other social services or the Department of 
Education (for school attendance conditionalities).  A recent analysis by the General Accounting Office
69 
reveals that, while existing automated systems do provide some of the information needed, significant gaps 
remain.  Indeed, a major shortcoming of current automated systems is that the multiple systems used by the 
multiple agencies involved in providing such services to TANF recipients do not share data on beneficiaries.  
This shortcoming constrains the ability of case managers to arrange needed services, ensure that these 
services are provided, and respond quickly when problems arise (or when conditionalities are not met).    29
Examples of such deficiencies abound, with reports of erroneous sanctions being applied to clients for whom 
information on work activities was not transferred electronically between the automated systems of the labor 
and welfare departments. 
 
A lack of information on the receipt of complementary social services by welfare clients also hinders the 
ability of case managers to devise appropriate services strategies for their clients.  While most case managers 
in a recent GAO survey indicate that they do have desktop access to data in automated systems for the main 
welfare programs (TANF, food stamps and Medicaid), many do not have access to information on 
unemployment insurance, child care subsidies, job listings, child welfare programs, vocational rehabilitation 
and subsidized housing.  For example, local officials in New Jersey and Ohio report that case managers are 
unable to determine which of the children receiving TANF assistance are also involved in the child welfare 
system.
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Automated Systems as a Tool for Performance-Based Management.  The 1996 welfare reforms also 
brought about far-reaching changes in reporting requirements.  These changes have presented challenges for 
automated systems in their role as a tool for performance-based management, both for service planners and 
for program managers.  A recent General Accounting Office Report found that while existing systems 
provide some information needed for planning services and evaluating program performance, other 
significant gaps remain.   
With respect to service planning, local officials in particular indicated that it is often difficult to extract 
information on caseload characteristics, such as previous work experience of beneficiaries, clients with 
substance abuse or mental health problems, and the share of cases that have cycled on-and-off of welfare 
over the past five years (repeat clients).  Gaps in information occur for two reasons: (a) the desired data are 
not contained in automated systems; and (b) even though the data exist, they are difficult or impossible to 
extract in a way that answers the particular question of concern to the program manager.   
 
Existing automated systems also have some shortcomings in their ability to generate information for 
program oversight, evaluation and reporting requirements.  The inability of the systems to track time of 
beneficiaries against federal time limits (across states) is a key deficiency for one of the main performance 
indicators of welfare reform.  Program managers, particularly those at the local level, also cite problems in 
reporting of work participation rates for their area from the state, receiving state-calculated rates that do not 
match the locality’s own-calculated figures, and not being able to interpret the state-provided reports on local 
participation rates.  These shortcomings hinder the evaluation of program performance and the use of 
automated systems and program data as a tool for results-based management.  
 
Upgrading Automated Systems to Better Serve Welfare Policy 
 
Some of these information obstacles to the implementation of welfare policy and performance-based 
management stem from a lack of inter-state systems or a national database (e.g., time limits, duplicate 
benefits), while others stem from a lack of cross-program systems interfaces within states (e.g., 
implementation of conditionalities, provision of complementary support services).  In fact, the Federal 
Government and specific state agencies are exploring or implementing solutions for both types of problems.   
 
Options for Creating a National Database.  A national database to track participation in federal means-
tested welfare programs is warranted for to monitor federal lifetime time limits and to prevent duplication in 
benefits across states.  Delegation of automated systems to the states also results in a duplication of 
administrative costs that could have been avoided if the federal government had instead developed a national 
database.   
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Several recent government reports have explored options for creating a national database to track 
participation in federal means-tested public assistance programs.   In fact, recognizing the challenges that 
welfare reform would place on existing state automated information systems, the 1996 reforms directed the 
Secretary of HHS to prepare a report on the status of state systems to support the requirements of the reforms 
and to identify options for constructing a system capable of tracking recipients over time and across states.  
Congress also directed that the report include a plan for building on the automated data processing systems of 
the States to establish a national system, and estimates of the cost and the amount of time required to 
establish such a system.  In its December 1997 report to Congress,
71 HHS identified five alternative 
architectures
72 for meeting the participant tracking requirements of the law.  The USDA then followed up in 
1999 with a study of the feasibility of these options for constructing a national database to track participation 
in public assistance programs.
73  This study concluded that the development of an eligibility database 
architecture
74 (one of the five options identified in the HHS report) would be feasible and cost-effective if 
developed jointly for both TANF and the food stamps program.  In fact, while the development of such a 
system is likely to be costly (an estimated total five-year cost of some US$39 million), the estimated benefits 
in recovered or avoided food stamps and TANF payments is likely to be higher (an estimated US$72 million 
over five years).   The GAO followed up with related recommendations in support of federal coordination in 
automated systems.   
 
Despite the abundance of federal reports on the subject, a national beneficiary database has not been 
established.   The main obstacles appear to be: (a) a lack of approved funding for the project; (b) existing 
federal funding and institutional arrangements for the food stamps and TANF programs (separate ministries 
and funding streams); and (c) perhaps a lack of political will across the states (e.g., entrenched interests for 
existing systems, reticence on behalf of some states to truly enforce time limits, existing constituencies for 
the status quo, etc.).   
 
State Projects for Systems Upgrades.  Despite the lack of action on the federal level, virtually all states are 
undertaking projects to improve their own automated welfare information systems.  Such improvements 
involve both (a)  upgrading the technologies and capacities of the systems used; and (b)  expanding and 
improving the functions that these systems perform.
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As discussed above, many states are still fumbling with 1970s and 1980s mainframe technologies.  The age 
of these systems has limited their ability to take advantage of technological improvements because the 
underlying equipment and software platforms are incompatible with new technologies.  In New York, for 
example, costs and time have prevented a full modernization and replacement of the state’s large mainframe 
system; instead, the state operates a dual system, relying primarily on its mainframe, but with a separate 
system to meet new data reporting requirements.  Other states are adding upgrades and enhancements to 
existing systems, while still others are installing entirely new systems.
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Indeed, various innovations in technology offer significant opportunities for improving the delivery of 
human services.
77  Personal computers can now process more data at lower costs, making it possible to 
automate even small service providers in local communities.  Telecommunications networks are more widely 
available, providing greater opportunities for data sharing among different programs that serve the same 
populations.  The Internet provides opportunities to link program applicants, recipients, case managers and 
administrators to each other, and to a wealth of information needed to achieve various objectives.  Many 
technologies (graphical user interfaces, photographs, movies, sound clips) can facilitate program orientation, 
assessment and training.  Geographic referencing and mapping allows program planners to target services to 
families and neighborhoods.  Other technological advances make it possible to store and retrieve large 
volumes of data with greater efficiency at less cost than was possible when most US systems were originally 
developed for the purposes of reporting and performance management.  Most states are working to upgrade 
or replace old systems to take advantage of these new technologies.   
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Two main types of functional improvements include:
78  
(a)  Improving system support to program implementation and service delivery.  Many states are 
adopting projects to increase the desktop access of frontline case managers to data on beneficiaries 
across programs.  These include developing links among separate systems, replacing existing 
systems with new integrated systems, and constructing electronic networks to link agencies and 
service providers.  The goal is to allow frontline workers improved desktop access to data so that 
they can obtain a more holistic view of beneficiaries and their families to better assess their needs 
and strengths for improved case management.  Some practitioners have indicated that simplifying 
access for clients and linking programs and services does not require cutting edge technology or the 
development of physical “one-stop shops” (co-locating staff from different programs at single 
integrated offices), rather simple desktop technologies can help promote such integration through 
“one-screen” innovations, that is, making data from different programs available to a case-worker on 
a single computer screen.
79 
(b) Improving systems use as a tool for performance-based management.  States are also working to 
improve the capabilities of program managers to obtain and analyze data from different programs 
through new databases and query tools.  These tools enable users to perform on-line queries and 
generate customized reports that meet their particular information needs.  In addition, states are 
extracting and consolidating data from multiple systems into data marts, data warehouses, and other 
specialized databases (see below) to which more sophisticated query tools can be applied.
80   
In addition to costs (discussed below), three key challenges for systems modernization in the United States 
include: (a) enhancing strategic collaboration among different levels of government, and in particular, 
involving localities (not just states and federal agencies) in the design and conception of new systems under a 
common collaborative framework; (b) simplifying the cumbersome approval process for obtaining federal 
funding for information systems (discussed above); and (c) obtaining staff expertise in project management 
and information technology, particularly given the competition with the private sector for such personnel.
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Costs of Automated Systems 
The development and constant upgrading and maintenance of automated welfare information systems is 
costly, in terms of time, staffing, and money.  
 
Time.  Available information indicates that the average time needed to develop and launch a web-based 
integrated automated client eligibility 
system is at least two years.
82  T h i s  
estimate assumes constant policy 
parameters.  In fact, policy changes 
have historically resulted in lengthy 
delays in the development of automated 
systems.  For example, Maryland’s 
integrated CIS/CARES system took 
close to a decade to develop.
83  As one 
official put it “time is the enemy of 
automated systems” (see Box).   
Development of the system started in the early 1990s and the system was piloted in 1993.  By 1996, 17 
counties were using an early version of CARES.  However, a series of policy changes, first with waivers in 
the early 1990s and then with the 1996 reforms, delayed implementation and resulted in the need for major 
changes in the development of the system.  The transition was difficult as it involved simultaneously 
converting some counties from the early version of CARES and others from the previous automated system 
(AIMS).  Maryland’s CARES was finally launched statewide in March 1998.  The system covers all main 
welfare programs (cash under TANF/TCA, food stamps, welfare, emergency assistance) which are integrated 
Box 5 - Systems Upgrades: An Endless Process 
 
“Time is the enemy of the automated system.  Policies vary, 
becoming evermore complex; information becomes outdated; and 
technology changes.  Systems must constantly adapt and be 
upgraded.”  -- Officials at the Maryland Family Investment 
Administration.   
 
“Modifying and developing automated systems that better support 
welfare reform is a long-term and evolving process.”  -- Report by the 
General Accounting Office.   32
under the CARES system and linked to automated systems for child support and social services under the 
umbrella “hub” system known as CIS.   
 
People.  Information systems also require significant staffing inputs, both at state and local offices.  For 
example, some 50 staffers are involved in the on-going development, administration and maintenance of 
Maryland’s CARES system (some on the systems side, some on the policy side).
84  As noted above, one of 
the key challenges facing states in the modernization of systems is the difficulties associated in attracting and 
retaining project managers and information technology specialists because these specialists command high 
salaries in the private sector.
85 
 
Money.   The development and upgrading of automated systems is likewise a costly endeavor in terms of 
financial costs, though these costs vary significantly depending on the nature and extent of the project.  On 
average, upgrades and enhancements to existing automated systems average between US$5-15 million, 
whereas contracts for new systems can be far higher, between US$50-100 million or higher, depending on 
the nature of technology, the system capacity, and the nature and scope of the project.
86  Some examples 
include: 
•  Estimated Costs of National Database.  The construction of a national eligibility database for 
tracking beneficiaries across states is estimated to cost US$16.2 million in development costs in year 
1, with annual operating costs of US$4-5 million, for a total five-year cost of some US$39 million.  
As discussed above, this compares with an estimated US$72 million in benefits over a five year 
period, arising from recovered or avoided erroneous food stamps and TANF payments.   
•  Historical Costs of State System Development.  The development of Maryland’s integrated 
CIS/CARES system cost an estimated US$125 million (over the decade or so of development, see 
above), which was close to US$100 more than was originally budgeted for the project.  Operational 
costs include US$15 million/year for the data center contract, US$12 million/year for the software 
maintenance contract, and another 50% for all other indirect IT maintenance costs.
87  Maryland’s 
system currently supports about 5,000 active users, covering 500,000 unduplicated cases and some 
100 million records.
88  Officials of Maryland’s Family Investment Administration estimate that this 
system has resulted in a 30% improvement in efficiency over the previous system (AIMS).  
•  New Web-Based System.   The DHS in the State of Maine recently signed a US$12.3 million, 
fixed-price contract with private contractors to build a web-based automated client eligibility system 
(ACES).
 89  This new system will provide the Bureau of Family Independence (Dept of Human 
Services) with the means to determine eligibility for TANF, food stamps and Medicaid, along with 
other programs and many social services.
90  The system will serve some 600 users, covering about 
150,000 clients.
91   
•  New System Enhancements for Improved Case Management.  The state government of Texas 
recently signed a US$4.9 million contract to design the web-enabled Integrated Eligibility Redesign 
system, including eligibility functions, along with a US$1.9 million contract to another firm to 
develop the validation and verification services for Texas’ automated system.  Texas is currently 
developing a major data warehouse system to support management in program and performance 
evaluation, develop an internet-accessible repository of data from eight data marts (databases), and 
provide eight years of labor market data.
92  The system will cover virtually all of Texas’ welfare 
programs, employment services, unemployment insurance, and NAFTA support services.  The 
current system supports about 12,000 users, covering approximately 1.5 million clients 
(unduplicated) in various welfare programs.   
•  New System Upgrades for Improved Program Management.  The state government of Ohio 
recently signed a contract of US$20 million to develop the state’s integrated client management 
system.  Ohio is currently developing a data warehouse system to provide a single repository of all 
transactions data from the DHS including five years of historical data, with instantaneous responses   33
to queries.
93  The new system will integrate information for TANF, Medicaid, food stamps, child 
care, child support and child welfare.  It will also provide data needed to meet federal TANF 
reporting requirements.  It is currently being piloted in only 12 counties (currently serving 179 users 
and 20,000 clients), though this will soon be expanded.
94   
 
Overall, the US federal and state governments have spent in the billions on systems development over the 
past few decades.  While consistent time series data on the total cost of systems development are not 
available, the following estimates give some idea of the magnitudes involved: 
•  Early years: 1984-92.  The federal government provided about US$8.6 billion in support to state 
development of automated welfare systems over the period from 1984-92, or an average of US$1.1 
billion per year, which represented about 50% of total spending on these systems (with states 
covering the rest).
95  This compares with total annual spending on benefits from AFDC, food stamps, 
and Medicaid in 1992 of close to US100 billion in 1992, covering 13.8 million AFDC beneficiaries, 
31.2 million Medicaid beneficiaries, and about 26.4 million food stamps beneficiaries in that year.
96   
•  Reform Years: 1994-2000.  A GAO report estimates that that the federal government would end up 
covering much of the needed US$10.7 billion in additional automated systems costs through from 
1994-2000 (or about US1.8 billion per year).
97   
•  Recent Years: Escalating Costs in 2003-2005.  Total annual information technology expenditures 
for major welfare programs related services in the US (all states) are estimated at US$7.3 billion in 
2003 and are expected to reach US9.6 billion in 2005.
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EVALUATIONS OF OUTCOMES: TARGET ACCURACY 
Targeting outcomes (accuracy and coverage) always differ somewhat from the theoretical design of 
eligibility criteria and the targeting methods applied in practice.  In all social assistance programs – 
regardless of targeting mechanism – there is always some leakage of benefits to the “non-poor” and 
unfortunate exclusion of potentially eligible poor people.  While these errors cannot be avoided, careful 
targeting can help reduce them.  For means-tested programs, this generally implies clear definition of 
eligibility criteria, consistent application of these criteria, thorough verification of information provided, 
cross-checking with other systems (e.g., computer matches with automated systems), and incentives to 
promote accuracy and reduce fraud.   
The US has certainly taken many of these inputs to target accuracy to the extremes, with rigorous and 
complex procedures for checking, double-checking, and triple-checking all information provided.  As 
discussed below, the results of this rigor are evident: the programs are indeed well-targeted in terms of 
outcomes.  Nonetheless, errors of exclusion – or under-participation – of potentially eligible beneficiaries do 
suggest that an important share of the target group are being missed by the system.  These findings are based 
on three types of data and analyses: (a) absolute incidence analysis using household survey data; (b) a review 
of error rates using Quality Control data; and (c) a review of findings regarding non-participation of 
potentially eligible households (errors of exclusion).   
Targeting Outcomes: Absolute Incidence 
US social assistance programs are very well targeted according to the results of the Urban Institute’s 
National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF).
99  The distributional incidence of these programs shows 
very little leakage to the non-poor and the lion’s share of the benefits going to those in the poorest quintile 
(Figure 1).  Nonetheless, there is some variation in target outcomes among these programs – largely due to 
differences in key design features of each program: 
•  Food Stamps: Emphasis on Target Accuracy Pays Off.  The food stamps program is extremely 
well targeted – the best of all safety net programs for which incidence information is available.    34
Some 80% of all food stamps benefits accrued to the poorest quintile (20%) of the population in 
1998.  Leakage to the top two quintiles is extremely low (2% for the fourth quintile and 0.6% for the 
top quintile).  This relatively strong result for target accuracy makes sense, given the strong emphasis 
of the food stamps program on eligibility as a key indicator of performance – and the financial 
incentives (penalties and rewards) levied on states for complying with this performance indicator 
(see above). 
•  TANF.  The TANF program is not quite as well-targeted as the food stamps program, though its 
target accuracy is still impressive.  The poorest quintile received two thirds of all TANF benefits, 
followed by the second quintile, which received 17% in 1998.  Leakage to the top two quintiles 
represents about 5.6% and 2.2% for quintiles four and five respectively.  Unlike the food stamps 
program which emphasizes target accuracy as a key performance indicator, the federal government 
does not even establish national criteria for targeting and eligibility.  Rather, under TANF, the main 
emphasis of the federal government is on promoting self-sufficiency and monitoring compliance 
with work requirements.  This emphasis could lead states to concentrate on beneficiaries with a 
slightly different profile (as well as some self-selection out of the program, as discussed above) than 
those under the food stamps program.  Nonetheless, the average income cutoff for TANF eligibility 
is slightly lower than that for food stamps (targeting a slightly poorer group on average), so one 
might expect a larger share of benefits to go to those in the bottom quintile under TANF than 
actually observed.   
•  EITC and SSI.   The earned-income tax credit and SSI are not quite as well targeted to the poorest 
quintile, which makes sense since they accrue only to working (in the case of EITC) or non-working 
disabled (in the case of SSI) beneficiaries.  Nonetheless, their targeting record is respectable, with 
the poorest quintile receiving about half of all benefits.   
In contrast, the benefits of social insurance (which includes social security, workman’s compensation and 
unemployment insurance) are far less well targeted to the poor.  In fact, the distribution of benefits of social 
insurance programs closely mirrors that of the population (with roughly equal shares distributed across the 
quintiles).   
Compared to targeted programs in developing countries, social assistance programs in the US perform quite 
well.  Annex Table 1 compares the targeting outcomes of safety net programs around the world.
100  
Outcomes are measured and compared by dividing the share of total benefits that accrues to the target group 
(e.g., the poorest quintile) by the target group’s share in the population.  For example, the outcome indicator 
for the food stamps program is 4.00 because the poorest quintile receives four times more than they would 
have received under a universal population-neutral intervention (80% accrues to the poorest 20% of the 
population).  In fact, compared to targeting outcomes in developing countries, this outcome for the food 
stamps program is among the best in the world (tied with Argentina’s Trabajar program, which is self-
targeted using a work requirement).  The TANF program likewise ranks among the best-targeted programs, 
with an outcome indicator of 3.31 (See Annex Table 1).  Even the EITC and SSI rank among the top ten 
programs in terms of targeting outcomes.    35
Figure 1 - US Social Protection Programs: Distribution of Program Benefits by Quintile
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Error Rates Reveal the Importance of Verifications 
 
As discussed above, the government (federal and state) routinely monitors the accuracy of eligibility 
decisions for food stamps through the use of Quality Control (QC) sampling and the calculation of error 
rates.  These error rates provide another way to measure targeting outcomes (accuracy).  Data on QC error 
rates suggests the following patterns: 
•  Average national error rates.  Error rates for food stamps have been falling, reaching record lows 
in 2002, with an average over-payment rate of 6% an average under-payment rate of 2%, for a 
combined payment error rate of 8% (Table 6).  Some 8% of all applicants were also erroneously 
denied or terminated from the program.  These error rates are quite low, but have fallen despite an 
increase in case-loads due to a recession at that time (which could have increased error rates instead).  
The reduction in error rates likely reflects improvements in verification, computer matching and 
automation.   
•  Error rates by household characteristics.  Studies have shown that error rates are higher for 
certain types of households – such as those with earned incomes (which are harder to track and 
verify than unearned income such as other program benefits) or immigrant applicants (due to the 
increasing strictness and complexity of recent welfare reforms regarding immigrant eligibility).
101  
Computer matches and verifications of income and citizenship information appear to be facilitating 
these checks, and hence reducing error rates (for these groups and overall) over time.  Furthermore, 
as discussed above, some states require more frequent re-certification for households with frequently 
changing circumstances (such as those with earned income) as a way to reduce their error rates.  
•  State-by-state variation.  Many states are consistently over the national average in their error rates, 
while others have consistently better error rates. This suggests that certain verification systems or 
procedures in specific states are better than others (since eligibility criteria for the food stamps 
program are uniform across the country).     36
•  The crucial role of verification.  An experiment in the State of Maryland also reveals the crucial 
role of verifying incomes and assets.  While verification is standard in the US – and has become 
more rigorous over time with the help of computer matches and automated systems – there was a 
brief period in the 1970s in which policy makers decided to abandon verification.  The idea of this 
experiment was to revert to the system used for tax filing, in which individuals self-declare incomes 
(with no systematic verification for all filers/applicants).  Policy makers believed that the threat of 
audits would be enough to induce people to provide honest and accurate information.  The 
experiment with reliance on self-declared incomes failed. Error rates shot up to 53.5% for the case 
error rate (at that time error rates were mainly tracked as a share of cases rather than payments) and a 
payment error rate of 23%.
102  This compares with average payment error rates of 13.5% for the State 
of Maryland from 1998-2000.
103  The experiment was thus short-lived, and vigorous verification 
procedures were restored, reducing error rates back to their average levels. 
Table 6 – Targeting Accuracy in the Food Stamps Program:  Data on Error Rates 
  Active Case Error Rates (% of total benefits paid out) 
 Over-Payment  Under-Payment Combined  Error  Rate 
Negative Case Error 





















Active error rates calculate over-payments and under-payments to beneficiaries as a share of total spending on food stamps.  Under-payments do not 
include the benefits that should have been received by applicants who were wrongly denied or terminated.  See above for more details. 
Negative error rates calculate cases (people) that were wrongly denied or terminated as a share of total applications. 
Sources: Rosenbaum, Dorothy and David Super (April 30, 2001).  “Understanding Food Stamp Quality Control.” Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities; and Rosenbaum, Dottie (July 8, 2003).  “Food Stamp Overpayment Error Rate Hits Record Low.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.   
 
Coverage and Errors of Exclusion 
In addition to leakage, over-payment or under-payment rates, another important concept of target accuracy is 
the degree to which the target group participates in the program.  In this respect, it appears that the 
performance of US welfare programs is worsening.  Of all individuals that are eligible for TANF, only about 
half participate.  This take-up rate is the lowest in decades, falling from 85% for AFDC in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, to just 52% of qualifying families participating in 1999
104 and remaining at about half of all 
eligible families in 2000.
105 
Several features of TANF could deter potential beneficiaries from participating, particularly work 
requirements, time limits, stricter restrictions on immigrant participation, and welfare diversion strategies (as 
discussed above). A recent study by the Urban Institute suggests that a significant share (17-34%) of eligible 
non-participants, representing 0.5-1.0 million families, could gain substantial income and important services 
by enrolling in TANF.
106  Lack of participation among this group – which disproportionately consists of 
single Hispanic parents and those with barriers to employment (the “hard-to-serve”) – is of concern.   
Misunderstandings about the new welfare policy have likely kept some of these eligible families away from 
the program.    
Falling TANF caseloads are particularly worrisome in recent years since the declines have corresponded with 
a recent upturn in poverty (as discussed above).  While the number of children receiving TANF assistance 
fell by about 330,000 (or 7.5%) from 2000 to 2001, the number of children living in extreme poverty (in 
families with income below half the poverty line) increased by about 400,000 during that same time period.  
The trend continues in 2002 and 2003, with both child poverty and unemployment among single mothers 
rising in that time period.
107  Nonetheless, TANF caseloads continue to decline.   
The participation of potentially eligible food stamps beneficiaries has likewise declined, probably due to 
spill-over effects of TANF and further misunderstandings about eligibility and welfare rules.  Whereas 
historical program participation hovered around 70%, by 1997 it had fallen to just above 50%.
108   37
These less-than-stellar results for coverage of the eligible target group suggest that, in addition to the 
rigorous verification efforts to prevent leakage and fraud, the governments (federal and state) should devote 
additional resources to outreach efforts to better promote and explain the programs to target groups.  In 
addition, in addition to tracking work participation rates (for TANF) and target accuracy (QC error rates for 
food stamps), the federal government should consider monitoring and rewarding reductions in poverty rates 
as key performance indicators for safety net programs.
109 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LAC 
The use of means-tested systems in the US can be of interest to policymakers in LAC, both for their positive 
features and strong targeting outcomes, and to help others avoid their weaknesses.   
With respect to the overall US safety net, some key messages emerge: 
•  Fragmentation is inefficient.  The proliferation of over 80 federal social assistance programs is 
inefficient, causing confusion among beneficiaries, unnecessarily complex processes for applications 
and eligibility, and duplications of administrative costs.  Such fragmentation also exists in LAC, 
though some countries (such as Brazil) are rightly considering integrating or better coordinating their 
social assistance programs.   
•  Local attempts to integrate have helped.  While policymakers have not been able to unify the 
safety net at the federal level, local offices have attempted to integrate application and eligibility 
screening processes (but not criteria).  These efforts have helped simplify the maze of federal 
procedures and requirements and reduced duplicate administrative burden to some extent.   
•  Active case management helps beneficiaries.   Likewise, active case management helps link 
beneficiaries to a range of social assistance programs and social services.  This “integration” of 
services and transfers can help beneficiaries not only with their immediate cash needs, but also by 
facilitating their access to services that could help them escape poverty.  Such practices are labor-
intensive, however, and generate higher administrative costs.   
With respect to the implementation and outcomes of means-tested systems, some key messages include: 
•  Means-tested systems can have impressive targeting outcomes.  In general, US safety net 
programs are quite well targeted, with a high share (48-80% depending on the program) of benefits 
accruing to the lowest quintile, and very low leakage to the non-poor.   
•  Some key ingredients for implementing means-tested programs include: 
o  Identification of individuals.  A clear and unique identification system is a crucial 
ingredient for the proper targeting of individuals.  US safety net programs are aided in this 
respect by the widespread use of social security numbers (SSNs).  These numbers help 
identify individuals, verify information and run computer cross-checks to match them across 
programs and automated systems (see below).  SSNs are not perfect, however, since there is 
some degree of errors, duplications, fraud, and gaps in coverage of SSNs.  As such, states 
have devised several ways of identifying individuals, including (a) computer-generated 
numbers based on key characteristics (including, but not limited to, SSNs); and (b) the use 
of biometric technology, particularly digital fingerprinting.  Without clear and consistent 
identification, social assistance programs risk duplication, fraud, and targeting errors.   
o  Rigorous verification.  Another key ingredients for the US’s impressive targeting outcomes 
is rigorous verification of incomes, assets, and identity.  All US safety net programs rely on   38
extensive verification – through documentation and computer matching (see below) – for 
the implementation of means-testing.  Verification not only helps reduce fraud (intentional 
program violations), but also helps reduce non-intentional errors (income and asset recall; 
accuracy of information).  Evidence from the food stamps program reveals the importance 
of verification: (a) when the State of Maryland attempted to abandon verification (relying 
instead on self-declared incomes), error rates shot up dramatically (see above); and 
(b)  verification has helped reduce error rates for population groups with variable 
circumstances, such as those with earned incomes (see above). 
o  Random-sample audits.  The food stamps program has developed extensive monitoring of 
target accuracy through random sample audits (quality control), both by states and by the 
federal government.  These audits (and the financial incentives attached to them, see below) 
help improve targeting outcomes, as evidenced by the relatively higher target accuracy 
(lower leakage rates) for the food stamps program than the other programs (see above).   
•  Automated systems provide a key tool for implementation of means-testing.  A s  d i s c u s s e d  
above, automated information systems have been critical in implementing means-testing in the US.  
Automated systems serve many purposes for means-testing, including: determining eligibility, 
helping verify eligibility through within- and cross-system computer matches, recording applicant 
case histories, calculating benefit levels, and triggering the issuance of payments.  They also help 
support case management and service planning, monitor compliance with conditionalities, and 
monitor program performance (as discussed both above and below).   
•  A national database would provide many advantages.  Despite the usefulness of automated 
systems in implementing means-tested programs, the lack of a national database is a significant 
inefficiency in the US welfare system.  National beneficiary systems have many advantages: (a) the 
ability to track and reduce duplications in benefits across states and localities; (b) the ability to 
monitor time limits; and (c)  a reduction in the duplication of administration costs (systems 
development, software, operation and maintenance, etc.).   
•  Automated systems can also serve as a tool for monitoring conditionalities.  The shift from 
“passive” social assistance to “active” welfare policy in the US meant the introduction of key 
conditionalities designed to help beneficiaries escape from poverty, including work requirements 
and conditionalities tied to human capital development (schooling, health care).  LAC countries 
have likewise shifted towards the use of conditional cash transfers (CCTs).  Automated systems 
must adjust to these policy changes and provide a tool for monitoring compliance with such 
requirements, linking such compliance to payments.  US automated systems are being upgraded to 
meet these new requirements.  LAC countries should consider similar upgrades so as to ensure that 
they key features of CCTs – their links to human capital development – are properly enforced.   
•  Permanent, on-demand access is a positive feature, allowing US welfare programs the potential 
of serving as a dynamic safety net to catch people when they fall.  Access to transfer programs in 
LAC, on the other hand, is limited both in time (often with single rounds of applications occurring 
only every year or more) and in number of places (with quotas rationing available slots).  Without 
permanent access, LAC transfers fail to serve the dynamically changing poor population.   
Transparency is also needed in rationing available slots among the potentially eligible.   
•  However, outreach is needed to bring in the excluded.  Although on-demand applications are a 
positive feature of US welfare programs, more outreach efforts are needed to bring in the self-
excluded, since take up rates have fallen to about half of the total eligible population.    39
•  Performance-based management: emphasis on target accuracy and poverty reduction.  The 
emphasis on target accuracy as a key indicator of performance-based management for the food 
stamps program has been an important input to the very impressive targeting outcomes for that 
program.  Financial incentives (penalties and rewards) based on target accuracy have reinforced the 
use of this indicator for program performance.  US welfare programs should, however, also adopt 
indicators of poverty reduction for performance monitoring, as this would provide improved 
incentives to states for conducting the outreach needed to bring in excluded eligible non-
participants.  While financial penalties for poor targeting outcomes may not be politically (or 
administratively feasible) in developing countries, LAC countries may want to consider providing 
financial rewards (“bonuses”) to localities (states, municipalities) that do implement strong targeting 
outcomes (accuracy) and succeed in reducing poverty.  Such performance-based management would 
require a strong data monitoring system (e.g., via random sample audits as in the food stamps 
program, and/or household survey systems that yield measures of poverty and targeting incidence of 
social programs).     40 
Annex Table 1 - Targeting Performance by Targeting Mechanism: International Comparison 
















Other Work Consumption Community 
bidding 
Argentina PW    4.00    9       9       9    
US Food 
Stamps 
NCT/FT 4.00   9  9                
Estonia CT    3.47    9  9                
US TANF  CT  3.31    9  9            9    
Hungary CT  2.72    9  9                
Albania CT  2.65  9      9       9      
US EITC  CT  2.59    9  9            9    
US SSI  CT/disabled  2.42    9  9                
Poland CT  2.10   9  9          9      
Chile CT  2.08   9    9       9  9      
Nicaragua CT  2.02  9        9    9  9      
Honduras CT  1.99  9        9    9  9      
Chile FT    1.98   9    9  9  9    9        
Slovenia CT  1.95    9  9        9        
                          
Bolivia PW  1.93  9        9       9    
Chile CT  1.83   9         9          
Peru FT  1.80    9       9    9       9 
Chile PW  1.78   9              9    
Indonesia NFS  1.68  9        9     9      
Bulgaria CT  1.65    9  9                
India NCT  1.63  9    9     9         9   
Mexico NCT  1.60    9  9     9    9        
India NCT  1.58  9        9         9   
Hungary CT  1.57    9          9        
                          
Mexico CT  1.56    9    9    9    9        
Costa Rica  FT  1.55    9       9    9        
Colombia NFS  1.50    9  9                
Indonesia PW  1.48  9        9     9  9    
Costa Rica  CT  1.48    9  9       9          
Jamaica NCT  1.45    9          9  9      
Indonesia CT  1.44  9      9  9    9  9      
India NCT  1.36  9        9         9   
Zambia NFS  1.35  9    9                
Uzbekistan CT  1.35  9    9    9     9  9      
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Table 3 continued  



















Other Work Consumption Community 
bidding 
Latvia CT  1.33   9          9        
India NCT  1.33  9         9         9   
Indonesia NCT  1.32  9     9    9     9      
Bolivia SF  1.30 9         9           9 
Jamaica NCT  1.30   9  9       9    9      
Romania CT  1.29    9          9        
Honduras SF  1.25  9         9           9 
Chile CT  1.25    9    9                
India NCT  1.25  9         9         9   
Sri Lanka  NCT  1.25  9    9                 
                            
S. Africa  FS  1.23    9                9   
Vietnam FT  1.22  9         9  9  9  9      
India NCT  1.20  9         9         9   
Bangladesh FT  1.20  9       9  9    9  9      
Morocco FS  1.18    9                9   
India NCT  1.13  9         9         9   
Armenia CT  1.13  9             9        
Peru SF  1.10    9       9           9 
Bulgaria CT  1.10    9         9          
Nicaragua SF  1.10  9         9           9 
                            
India NCT  1.09  9    9     9         9   
Zambia SF  1.08  9         9           9 
Mozambique CT  1.05  9    9       9  9  9      
India NCT  1.04  9         9         9   
Tunisia FS  1.03   9                9   
Uzbekistan CT  1.01  9    9    9       9      
Egypt FS  1.00  9                 9   
India NCT  1.00  9         9         9   
Latvia CT  1.00   9  9       9  9        
Egypt FS  0.98  9                 9   
   42 
Table 3 continued  
 



















Other Work Consumption Community 
bidding 
Bulgaria CT  0.95    9          9        
Egypt FS  0.95 9    9             9   
Egypt FS  0.95 9    9             9   
Armenia SF  0.93  9         9           9 
Tunisia FS  0.93    9                9   
Poland CT  0.90   9  9        9        
Romania CT  0.90    9         9    9      
                           
Morocco FS  0.85    9                9   
S. Africa  FS  0.79    9                9   
Latvia CT  0.70    9         9          
Algeria FS  0.70    9                9   
S. Africa  FS  0.68    9                9   
Morocco FS  0.60    9                9   
Armenia NCT  0.58  9     9                
Yemen FS  0.45  9                 9   
Vietnam CT  0.40  9           9    9      
S. Africa  FS  0.28    9                9   
                           
Sources: 
•  International comparisons: Coady, David, Margaret Grosh, and John Hoddinott (November 2002).  “The Targeting of Transfers I Developing Countries: Review of Experience and 
Lessons.”  Social Safety Net Primer Series.  The World Bank.  
•  US:  Author’s calculations using data from Zedlewski, Sheila (2002).  “Family Incomes: Rising, Falling or Holding Steady? In Welfare Reform: The Next Act.  The Urban Institute.  Based 
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